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THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE
DEVELOPING BIOENERGY INDUSTRY
ISABEL F. PERES,* TIMOTHY A. SLATING** & JAY P. KESAN***
ABSTRACT
For many countries, money grows on trees: woody biomass is one
of the most important sources of renewable energy in the European
Union. In the United States, biomass was the input for almost half of the
renewable energy generated in 2000; of the energy generated by biomass,
seventy-six percent was produced from wood.1 Currently, biomass is the
largest source of renewable energy in the country. The ability to secure
a reliable and stable supply of biomass is therefore extremely important
for the future of the renewable energy industry. According to the United
States Department of Energy, the success of the domestic bioenergy in-
dustry relies on many factors, including reliable, adequate supply of high-
quality biomass. In order for the bioenergy industry to continue to grow
and provide energy and fuel to millions of American homes and vehicles,
the organizational aspects of the biomass supply chain need to be clearly
defined and efficiently arranged. Dedicated biomass crops, which signifi-
cantly differ from traditional commodity crops, present unique character-
istics that bring uncertainties and costs to transactions that parties must
contract around. In this Article, we take a transaction cost economics ap-
proach to the relationships among biomass market players, and discuss
organizational choices ranging from spot market transactions to vertical
integration. One approach to vertical integration involves a firm controlling
different stages of its input supply chain. Vertical integration internalizes
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incentives and helps to reduce opportunism. In a vertically integrated bio-
energy industry, the biomass end-user would exercise substantial control
over the planting, harvesting, transporting, and storage of its biomass
feedstock. In this work, we argue that because the nascent bioenergy in-
dustry shows evidence of high asset specificity, parties would benefit from
a vertically integrated structure rather than a contractual model. We draw
our conclusions based on an analysis of model biomass contracts, and an
empirical study of agricultural disputes resolved through arbitration. We
conclude that at the outset of a dynamic bioenergy industry, vertical inte-
gration is the best organizational model to account for the asset specificity,
uncertainties, and transaction costs that characterize supply chains for
dedicated biomass crops.
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INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy is not a new trend; in fact, more than 150 years
ago, wood, which is traditionally the most common form of biomass, sup-
plied up to ninety percent of the energy needs in the United States.2 Today,
the country relies heavily on coal, oil, and natural gas for its energy, all
of which are non-renewable fossil fuels existing in finite quantities.3 As
the use of non-renewable fossil fuels increased, renewable energy use
decreased. Now, there is a need to take a second look at renewable energy
sources and how their markets are organized to find new ways to help
the country meet its energy needs.4 Biomass is a strong candidate to play
an important role in our energy mix and is already responsible for most
of the renewable energy currently used in the United States.5
Renewable energy resources, such as wind, solar energy, and or-
ganic matter, are naturally available and self-replenishing.6 Biomass is
2 Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy
explained/index.cfm?page=renewable_home (last updated Nov. 26, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/S5E5-8SHR; see Bruce A. Babcock et al., Opportunity for Profitable Investments
in Cellulosic Biofuels, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 714, 718 (2011) (“[F]orest residues include logging
residues, and thinning, rough, rotten, or salvageable logs. It has been estimated that up
to 45 million tons of such residues could be used economically in the U.S.”).
3 Types of Renewable Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM, http://www.renewable
energyworld.com/rea/tech/home (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/VX63-9LCJ.
4 See Renewable Energy Explained, supra note 2 (explaining the role of renewable energy
in the United States and how renewable energy has grown in the last decades).
5 Robert Wilson, Biomass: The World’s Biggest Provider of Renewable Energy, BREAKING
ENERGY (May 14, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://breakingenergy.com/2014/05/14/biomass-the
-worlds-biggest-provider-of-renewable-energy/, archived at http://perma.cc/3JXH-9XZN.
6 Types of Renewable Energy, supra note 3.
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a term used to generally refer to any type of organic matter that serves as
an input for energy production, and as a result of the large-scale produc-
tion of biofuel from corn grain, it is currently the single largest source of
renewable energy in the United States.7 Biomass can be used to produce
electricity, transportation fuels, and chemicals. The importance of renew-
able energy worldwide, and particularly in the United States, is expected
to grow in the coming years. About 9 quadrillion BTUs—1 quadrillion is
the number 1 followed by 15 zeros—of all energy consumed in the United
States in 2012 was from renewable sources, accounting for 9% of all energy
consumed, and the renewable share of total world energy consumption is
expected to rise to 14.2% by 2035.8 In addition, besides domestic develop-
ments in consumption of renewable energy, the country’s biomass industry
continues to enjoy a strong and positive demand from Europe, and, as a
result, it is investing heavily in biomass pellet production facilities.9 In
the European Union, which holds three-quarters of the world’s installed
capacity of solar photovoltaic energy, wood has surpassed both solar and
wind as a renewable energy input.10
The United States is also making renewable energy-related choices,
which will likely determine if tomorrow’s energy systems will be sustain-
able and reliable. Today’s choices will direct the country on how to upgrade
and expand its energy infrastructure.11 In light of the increasing impor-
tance of renewable energy sources, and specifically the future prospects
for the use of biomass powering the domestic energy economy, laws and
regulations are trying to provide the right incentives to develop a strong
bioenergy industry. For example, the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”)
program was created under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and established
7 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/IG-0892, THE DEP’T OF ENERGY’S ADMIN. OF ENERGY SAVINGS
PERFORMANCE CONTRACT BIOMASS PROJECTS 1 (2013).
8 Renewable Energy Explained, supra note 2; Renewable Energy, INST. FOR ENERGY RES.,
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/energy-overview/renewable-energy/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/65EE-XFYC (explaining the consumption of re-
newable energy in the United States).
9 Tim Probert, Biomass Industry 2012 Review: A Mixed Bag, RENEWABLE ENERGY
WORLD.COM (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012
/12/biomass-industry-2012-review-a-mixed-bag, archived at http://perma.cc/5LXS-ZPKH.
10 The Fuel of the Future, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/busi
ness/21575771-environmental-lunacy-europe-fuel-future, archived at http://perma.cc/PZ5S
-CZEJ.
11 Daniel Sosland & Jamie Howland, Will the US Choose the Right Road to a New Energy
Future?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.renewableenergy
world.com/rea/news/article/2014/03/will-the-us-choose-the-right-road-to-a-new-energy
-future, archived at http://perma.cc/NP3L-EUZ8.
2015] THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION 579
the first mandate for the commercialization of renewable fuel in the United
States.12 The goal of the RFS is to increase the United States’ use of biofuels
to thirty-six billion gallons per year by 2022, as well as increase biorefining
capacity in the country.13 Most biofuels in the United States are currently
derived from corn starch, which might have negative environmental con-
sequences, as well as undesirable impacts on food prices.14 In response
to these concerns, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
amended the RFS to require that approximately twenty-one billion gallons
of the RFS’s thirty-six billion gallon biofuel mandate must be comprised
of advanced biofuels (i.e., those made from non–corn starch feedstocks).15
The RFS program has also laid the foundation for further private invest-
ment in the domestic biofuels industry, and other federal and state policies
further encourage renewable energy production, including biomass utili-
zation.16 For instance, the Feedstock Flexibility Program for Producers
of Biofuel authorizes the use of funds to purchase surplus sugar for use
as a biomass feedstock to produce bioenergy.17 The Biomass Crop Assis-
tance Program also provides financial assistance to owners and operators
of agricultural and non-industrial private forestland who wish to produce
and deliver biomass feedstocks to bioenergy conversion facilities.18
Despite all of these policy efforts, attempts to promote biofuels from
a single perspective will likely not be successful, and government and pri-
vate initiatives will become futile unless the bioenergy industry develops
efficiently. As biomass supply chains develop, different obstacles may
12 Renewable Fuel Standard, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY http://www.epa.gov/oms
/fuels/renewablefuels/, archived at http://perma.cc/748T-9823 (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).
13 Philip T. Pienkos & Al Darzins, The Promise and Challenges of Microalgal-derived
Biofuels, 3 BIOFUELS, BIOPRODUCTS & BIOREFINING 431, 432 (2009), available at http://
www.afdc.energy.gov/pdfs/microalgal_biofuels_darzins.pdf.
14 Dajun Yue et al., Biomass-to-bioenergy and Biofuel Supply Chain Optimization: Overview,
Key Issues and Challenges, 66 COMPUTERS & CHEMICAL ENG’G 36, 36 (2014).
15 Pienkos & Darzins, supra note 13, at 432 (noting also that other advanced biofuels may
contribute to achieving the mandate).
16 See Wang Mingyuan, Government Incentives to Promote Renewable Energy in the United
States, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 355, 361–64 (2005) (discussing some of the major
laws for renewable energy in the United States); see also Renewable Fuel Standard,
RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/pages/renewable-fuel-standard,
archived at http://perma.cc/7GN9-GX97 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
17 JIM BOWYER, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY ON FOREST SECTOR
INDUSTRIES: PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR BIO-ENERGY WHILE PROTECTING ESTABLISHED
BIOMASS-BASED INDUSTRIES 20 (2011), available at http://www.dovetailinc.org/report
_pdfs/2011/dovetailbiomasswercprojectreport.pdf.
18 Id.
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emerge, such as planning of storage and processing facilities for specific
feedstocks, availability of cultivation technologies, transport constraints,
infrastructure for the distribution of biomass, air and water quality issues,
and wider issues of public acceptability and landscape quality.19
In this sense, the implementation of an efficient supply chain is
paramount to the development of the bioenergy industry.20 This is because
the ability to supply a high volume of renewable energy will depend on
a well-organized industry. The key players in the biomass supply chain
are farmers that grow the biomass feedstock (i.e., biomass producers), in-
termediaries (e.g., cooperatives and aggregators), and the facilities that
process this biomass into bioenergy (e.g., biomass processors or end-users,
which are commonly referred to as biorefineries).21 Whether biomass pro-
ducers can meet the bioenergy industry’s demand for biomass feedstock
will depend on how efficiently they respond to market challenges. The ques-
tion becomes how to organize the bioenergy industry: is market contract-
ing for biomass feedstock the optimal choice? Alternately, would vertical
integration be the preferred governance structure given the specific char-
acteristics of this nascent industry? At one extreme there is complete ver-
tical integration, in which a company internalizes all its biomass-related
economic activities in order to reduce transaction costs and uncertainties,
and take advantage of economies of scale. On the other extreme, there are
spot market transactions, in which goods are bought and sold in the ab-
sence of production contracts.22 The proper choice for the governance
structure is important because how parties organize themselves will influ-
ence how efficient and sustainable the bioenergy sector will become as the
industry progresses and technology advances. This is because the optimal
governance structure for a transaction (e.g., selling biomass feedstock for
the production of bioenergy) should be the one that incurs the least costs
to the parties in the transaction.23
19 THE ROYAL SOCIETY, SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 6 (2008),
available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publica
tions/2008/7980.pdf.
20 Mingyuan, supra note 16, at 364–65.
21 See The Biomass Supply Chain, WIS. GRASSLANDS BIOENERGY NETWORK, http://www
.wgbn.wisc.edu/biomass-supply-chain, archived at http://perma.cc/PU7S-UA4S (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2015).
22 Spot Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spotmarket.asp,
archived at http://perma.cc/6YEN-QAHL (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
23 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON., 233, 245 (1979) (noting that “[t]he criterion for organizing com-
mercial transactions is assumed to be the strictly instrumental one of cost economizing.”)
[hereinafter Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations].
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In 2007, Altman and Johnson argued for the importance of organiz-
ing the market for the development of the bioenergy industry from a trans-
action cost perspective. The authors studied the biopower industry, and
concluded that asset specificity should be considered in this industry, and
that further studies are necessary to determine the most efficient option
in individual cases. In 2009, Altman and Johnson showed that the bio-
power industry (i.e., the production of energy from biomass) in the United
States is mainly vertically integrated.24 Their study also found that after
vertical integration, short-term and long-term contracts are most commonly
used by power producers to purchase biomass, while spot market transac-
tions are rarely used.25 While spot markets may give more flexibility to
buyers and sellers of biomass, the study found that contracting and ver-
tical integration are the preferred options.26 Similarly, there are many
reasons why contracts and vertical integration may be preferred to spot
markets in the current biomass industry. One that will be explored in this
Article is the presence of asset specificity in biomass-related transactions.
Asset specificity generally refers to the use of a good for a narrow and
specific purpose.27 The narrower the use of the good, the more specific the
asset is considered to be.28 Some authors have explored the influence of
asset specificity on organizational structure and found that spot market
transactions may be a good choice when parties are flexible in regard to
quantity and quality of biomass, when there is low site asset specificity,
or when investment in machinery is low.29 On the other hand, in the pres-
ence of high asset specificity, spot markets are less efficient and a more
integrated and coordinated organization of the industry will be desired
to balance risks and costs involved in transactions.30
To date, few authors have specifically undertaken the study of what
the most optimal arrangement would be between biomass producers and
24 Ira Altman & Thomas Johnson, The Choice of Organizational Form as a Non-Technical
Barrier to Agro-Bioenergy Industry Development, 32 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 28, 28–34 (2008);
Ira Altman & Thomas Johnson, Organization of the Current U.S. Biopower Industry: A
Template for Future Bioenergy Industries, 33 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 779, 780 (2009).
25 Id. at 783.
26 Id. at 784 (the findings were based on a mail survey conducted by the University of
Missouri Community Policy Analysis Center in 2003).
27 Asset Specificity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset-specificity
.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/B9ZJ-JAFF (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
28 See id.
29 Ira Altman et al., Contracting for Biomass: Supply Chain Strategies for Renewable Energy,
2008 J. ASFMRA 1 (2008), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/189870/2
/281_altman.pdf [hereinafter Contracting for Biomass].
30 Id.
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biomass processors.31 We argue here that vertical integration is the most
appropriate organizational choice at the current, developing stage of the
bioenergy industry when biomass producers and processors remain faced
with substantial uncertainties. In this Article, we address these uncer-
tainties, add important empirical considerations to the literature, and inte-
grate these findings with the importance of asset specificity in choosing
the optimal organization structure for the bioenergy industry. We con-
duct an empirical analysis of model biomass contracts between producers
and processors, and between producers and cooperatives. We undertake
an empirical study of arbitration decisions involving typical agricultural
disputes, and we contrast those with similar potential sources of disputes
that will likely be encountered in the developing bioenergy industry. This
work considers the economic realities of the bioenergy industry in pur-
suit of the most efficient equilibrium in the industry.
First, we provide a general background on renewable fuels and
specify to which sector of the bioenergy industry we are referring. We also
establish the analytical framework relevant to existing biomass organiza-
tional models and contracting, and the costs and benefits associated with
the relevant organizational models.
Second, we discuss vertical integration and the importance of asset
specificity in the organization of the bioenergy industry. We also provide
general background on the main aspects of the biomass supply chain and
discuss how miscanthus, a perennial grass used for biofuel production,
is a prime example of the main challenges in this industry. Third, a re-
view of common disputes in agricultural contracts shows that the areas
where asset specificity is prevalent in biomass contracting are also the
areas where non-performance disputes in contracts for traditional crops
are the highest.
Finally, we contrast model biomass contracts with the biomass
research literature, and explore the relevant aspects of the economic reali-
ties of contracting in the bioenergy industry. We also determine how these
31 Altman & Johnson, supra note 24, at 28–34 (discussing the study emphasizing the pres-
ence of asset specificity in the biopower industry and how the industry appears to have orga-
nized itself in light of different levels of asset specificity); see, e.g., Altman & Johnson, supra
note 24, at 780 (noting that most of the biomass literatures focus on technical questions,
and there are few studies about the organization of future industries); L. Paul Goeringer
et al., The New Fuel Frontier: Biomass Contracting, 5 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES.
L. 71, 74 (2013) (arguing that while farmers have experience with crop and livestock con-
tracts, biomass production contracts present contracting parties with currently unresolved
legal issues); Xi Yang et al., Optimal Contracts to Induce Biomass Production under Risk 29
(Aug. 12–14, 2012) (Agric. & Applied Econ. Ass’n 2012 AAEA&NAREA Joint Ann.
Meeting) (noting the impact of risk preferences, land quality and riskiness of the biomass
production and prices on the optimal contract terms).
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contracts address the issues associated with asset specificity and high-
light their importance for the bioenergy industry. We then draw our con-
clusions on the most appropriate organization structure for the bioenergy
industry. This work aims to assist the decision-making process of actors
in the developing bioenergy industry in evaluating the most efficient supply
chain strategy for their operations.
I. THE BIOENERGY INDUSTRY
In general, renewable energy is defined as energy derived from
resources that are consistently and naturally replenished on a short time-
scale.32 The most common types of renewable energy are those derived
from biomass, water, geothermal heat, wind, and solar radiation.33 We will
focus here on bioenergy, which is a general term used to refer to renewable
energy derived from biomass.34 Bioenergy encompasses liquid biofuels
derived from biomass (e.g., cellulosic biofuels), thermal energy derived
from solid biomass (e.g., heating a home with biomass pellets), and elec-
tricity generated from the burning of biomass.35 Biomass is a general term
used to describe any plant-based organic material that contains stored
energy from the sun and is used to produce bioenergy.36 Biomass is there-
fore extremely abundant and includes all kinds of trees and plant-based
crops, whether purposefully cultivated or not.37
In this work, we mainly focus on biomass crops that are either
grown on agricultural land specifically for bioenergy-related purposes or
exist as residues from traditional crops (e.g., commodity corn and wheat).
If biomass is going to increase its participation in the world energy supply,
cultivation of dedicated, purposefully grown biomass crops will become
necessary.38 This is because while some biomass may be obtained from
wood wastes (e.g., saw mill waste) and crop residues (e.g., corn stover and
32 See Mingyuan, supra note 16, at 356 (discussing the different definitions of “renewable
energy”).
33 See Renewable Energy Explained, supra note 2 (discussing U.S. energy consumption
by energy source).
34 Bioenergy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com
/rea/tech/bioenergy, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4DS-QNQT (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
35 Bioenergy (Biofuels and Biomass), ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST., http://www.eesi.org
/topics/bioenergy-biofuels-biomass/description, archived at http://perma.cc/FTN3-8UCK
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
36 Biomass Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained
/index.cfm?page=biomass_home, archived at http://perma.cc/3HEF-GGP9 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
37 Peter McKendry, Energy Production from Biomass (Part 1): Overview of Biomass, 83
BIORESOURCE TECH. 37, 37 (2002).
38 Id. at 38.
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wheat straw), dedicated biomass crops will be required to meet the RFS’s
advanced biofuel mandates.39
Nearly all plants and organic wastes can be used to produce heat,
power, or fuel.40 Some of the common types of biomass feedstock gener-
ally found in the industry are grain and starch crops, such as sugarcane,
corn and wheat, and their agricultural residues, like corn stover.41 Exam-
ples of dedicated energy crops include switchgrass, miscanthus, and hybrid
willow trees.42 Miscanthus will be discussed in detail in Section III. Cur-
rently, it is not possible to determine which dedicated feedstock would be
the optimal feedstock for future biorefineries, because processing plants
and conversion technologies in the bioenergy industry are still in the early
stages of development.43
It is important to point out the different ways biomass can be
processed into bioenergy. First, biomass can be directly combusted to pro-
duce thermal energy for heating applications.44 An example of this would
be heating a home with a furnace designed to burn biomass pellets.45 Sec-
ond, biomass can be burned to produce electricity in much the same way
as traditional fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas (i.e., the biomass is
burned to generate thermal energy, which is used to convert water to steam
and drive electrical generators).46 Finally, biomass can be used to produce
biofuels through various processes that generally involve breaking the
biomass down into its component sugars and then fermenting them into
alcohols, which can serve as liquid fuels for internal combustion engines.47
39 Francis M. Epplin et al., Challenges to the Development of a Dedicated Energy Crop,
89 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 1296, 1296 (2007).
40 Growing Energy on the Farm: Biomass and Agriculture, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables
/growing-energy-on-the-farm.html, archived at http://perma.cc/69P9-FVDF (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
41 See Biomass Resources, N. AM. RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTORY, http://nared.org/bioenergy
/biomass-resources/, archived at http://perma.cc/95VF-8TYE (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
42 Id.
43 Russell W. Jessup, Development and Status of Dedicated Energy Crops in the United
States, 45 IN VITRO CELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY PLANT 282, 284 (2009).
44 Why Use Biomass for Heating?, BIOMASS THERMAL ENERGY COUNCIL, http://www.bio
massthermal.org/resource/PDFs/Fact%20Sheet%201.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3BQC
-ZY2V (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
45 Julie Maria Anderson, Wood Pellet Stoves vs. Oil, EHOW http://www.ehow.com/about
_6728540_wood-pellet-stoves-furnaces.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K79Y-G69S (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015).
46 See Why Use Biomass for Heating?, supra note 44 (discussing the advantages of using
biomass for heating).
47 See Carol Williams, Bioenergy Conversion Technologies, WIS. GRASSLAND BIOENERGY
NETWORK, http://www.wgbn.wisc.edu/conversion/bioenergy-conversion-technologies, archived
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The biomass supply chain includes the market players and the
operations that are necessary to move the biomass feedstock from the pro-
ducer to the end user while ensuring that the delivered feedstock meets
the specifications of the end user’s conversion process.48 The key parties in
the biomass supply chain are the farmer, responsible for the biomass pro-
duction, and the biomass processors who convert the biomass feedstock
into bioenergy.49 We generally refer to a biomass processing facility as a
“biorefinery.” A biorefinery can be defined as anything from a paper mill,
which burns its waste lignin to provide heat and power, to a state-of-the-
art cellulosic biofuel plant.50 A biorefinery is where biomass production
processes and equipment are integrated to produce fuels and generate heat
and/or power.51
Other market players may be involved in the biomass supply chain,
such as cooperatives and aggregators. In transactions involving these en-
tities, the biomass is transferred to a central location where the feedstock
is accumulated and later dispatched to the biorefinery.52 While at the cen-
tral location, the biomass may be pre-processed minimally or extensively.53
The relationship between farmers, aggregators, cooperatives, and the biore-
fineries in the biomass market will be further developed in Section III.
Biorefineries have been receiving extensive government support,
and a prime example of federal effort to further the bioenergy industry
in the United States Department of Energy working in partnership with
the industry to develop and validate integrated biorefineries around the
country.54 Integrated biorefineries generally produce different products
seeking to optimize the use of the biomass feedstock and production
economics, thereby employing various combinations of feedstock and
at http://perma.cc/V84R-P87T (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (discussing the fermentation
process).
48 Salman Zafar, Logistics of a Biopower Plant, BIOENERGY CONSULT (July 22, 2014,
7:37 PM), http://www.bioenergyconsult.com/biopower-logistics/ [hereinafter Logistics of
a Biopower Plant].
49 Goeringer et al., supra note 31, at 72, 74.
50 Definition: Biorefinery, OPENEI, http://en.openei.org/wiki/Definition:Biorefinery, archived
at http://perma.cc/4WPD-4E6V (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); What is a Biorefinery?, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/biomass/biorefinery.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/P6NV-W9H8 (last updated Sept. 28, 2009).
51 See What is a Biorefinery?, supra note 50 (analogizing the biorefineries concept to today’s
petroleum refineries).
52 Logistics of a Biopower Plant, supra note 48 (noting the role of central distribution).
53 Id.
54 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EE-0912, INTEGRATED BIOREFINERIES (2014), available at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/bioenergy/pdfs/ibr_portfolio_overview.pdf [hereinafter INTE-
GRATED BIOREFINERIES].
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conversion technologies.55 Federal support for “first-of-a-kind” integrated
biorefineries helps the industry to reduce both the costs, and the technical
and financial risks associated with the deployment of technology neces-
sary to accelerate growth in the United States bioenergy industry.56
While farmers can also receive government incentives to cultivate
biomass,57 they face many challenges in opting to grow biomass crops. For
instance, most farmers are not familiar with the growing practices that are
necessary to optimize the establishment and production of dedicated en-
ergy crops.58 There are also logistical challenges, such as the lack of mech-
anized harvesting equipment and the lack of means to efficiently and
economically transport biomass from its source to processing facilities.59 As
this Article will further demonstrate, an optimal biomass supply chain
must assist in solving these problems and take advantage of economies of
scale in the bioenergy industry.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Biomass Literature
As the organization of the bioenergy industry is of the utmost
importance, various authors have considered it through various perspec-
tives. Koppejan and Loo address biomass combustion and how to improve
combustion systems by emphasizing the importance of defining organiza-
tional issues.60 Roos et al. present a framework for the analysis of the bio-
energy market and identify “critical factors” that create barriers or drive
market growth, thereby contributing to the choice of organization in the
bioenergy market.61 These critical factors are integration with other eco-
nomic activity, scale effects, competition on bioenergy markets and other
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Biomass Crop Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fsa.usda.gov
/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=ener&topic=bcap, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6A3
-92UC (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).
58 The Next Generation of Biofuels: Cellulosic Ethanol and the 2007 Farm Bill: Field
Hearings in Brookings, South Dakota before the Subcomm. On Energy, 110th Cong. 6 (2007)
(statement of Anna Rath, Dir. of Bus. Dev., Ceres) http://www.ceres.net/PDF/2007_April4
%20Senate%20Ag%20Comm%20Testimony.pdf.
59 John M. Eustermann & Joe R. Thompson , The Law of Biomass: Biomass Supply Issues
and Agreements, http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/Biomass_Supply_Issues_and_Agree
ment_91109FF89D409.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
60 See Sjaak Van Loo & Jaap Koppejan, Preface to THE HANDBOOK OF BIOMASS COMBUSTION
AND CO-FIRING (2008).
61 Anders Roos et al., Critical Factors to Bioenergy Implementation, 17 BIOMASS & BIO-
ENERGY 113, 113, 115 (1999).
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businesses, national policy, local policy, and local opinion.62 Costello and
Finnell analyze other factors that also affect the organization of the bio-
mass market and the development of new technologies.63 They argue that
the key to a successful implementation of biomass power technologies can
be categorized as regulatory, financial, infrastructural, and perceptual.
Rösch and Kaltschmitt also examine other industry characteristics that
may cause a biomass project to fail.64 The aspects raised by these authors
are similar to the categories specified by Costello and Finnell, with the ad-
dition of the positive consequences of adequate flow of information and
insurance risks in the organization of the industry.
Downing et al. specify conditions under which the cooperative model
is an appropriate enterprise structure for the agro-bioenergy industry.65
The authors acknowledge that there are challenges in operat-ing cooper-
atives, but they see potential for success in the biomass industry. Differ-
ently, the research conducted by Overend finds that the biomass industry
should rely on short-term contracts or spot markets for the purchase of
biomass fuel rather than other supply chains, such as those internalized
through vertical integration.66 That is because the author argues that bio-
mass power will be a subset of the power industry, and only a few growers
would dedicate their resources to a dedicated energy crop with a single
end use.67
Altman et al. examine the choice of supply chain structure of
Iogen Corporation and found that ethanol processors are considering the
use of formal contracts for biomass procurement.68 A survey by Altman
and Johnson of the current biopower industry indicates that it is highly
vertically integrated.69 Their survey found that close to 75% of the industry
62 Id.
63 Raymond Costello & Janine Finnell, Institutional Opportunities and Constraints to
Biomass Development, 15 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 201, 201–04 (1998).
64 Christine Rosch & Martin Kaltschmitt, Energy From Biomass—Do Non-Technical
Barriers Prevent an Increased Use?, 16 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 347, 347–48, 350 (1999)
(listing organizational difficulties as a reason for failure).
65 Mark Downing et al., Development of New Generation Cooperatives in Agriculture for
Renewable Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Projects, 28 BIOMASS &
BIOENERGY 425, 425, 432–33 (2005).
66 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., BIOMASS POWER INDUSTRY: ASSESSMENT OF KEY PLAYERS
AND APPROACHES FOR DOE AND INDUSTRY INTERACTION, FINAL REPORT 1–2, 5 (1993) (ar-
guing that the biomass power industry will probably never be vertically integrated).
67 Id. at 5.
68 Ira J. Altman et al., Applying Transaction Cost Economics: A Note on Biomass Supply
Chains, 25 J. AGRIBUSINESS 107, 111–13 (2007) [hereinafter Applying Transaction Cost
Economics].
69 Altman & Johnson, supra note 24, at 779–80.
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chose to vertically integrate the biomass and biopower production stages.70
The research included industries using two categories of feedstock, wood
and waste, and it was also found that companies using wood and non-wood
have similar organizational preferences.71 The authors suggest then that
if the future bioenergy industry will be similar to the biopower industry, it
will likely also rely on vertical integration. Moreover, similarly to the expe-
rience in the biopower industry, the development of biomass spot markets
is unlikely, and contracting would be preferred in the bioenergy industry.72
On the other hand, Jody M. Endres et al. suggest that a hybrid structure
is likely to evolve in the biomass industry, where end-users (i.e., biorefin-
eries) cooperate with producers through long-term contracting instead of
end-users being direct owners or operators of the biomass producing
farms.73 The authors propose a “vertically coordinated” biomass industry
model based on contracts between end-users and farmers and incorporat-
ing a socioeconomic perspective into risk and cost minimizing approaches
in contract theory.74
Hi Yang et al. undertook an integrated analysis of the decision of
farmers and biomass end-users to enter into biomass production contracts,
in order to promote the development of the industry.75 The authors con-
sider the impact of risk preferences, land quality and riskiness of the bio-
mass production, and prices on the optimal contract terms.76 The authors
argue that for a given land quality, the choice of how the contract is de-
signed will vary according to the farmer’s level of risk aversion.77 Farmers
owning low quality land, as well as farmers with smaller opportunity costs
of crop production, are more likely to accept biomass production contracts.78
The authors evaluated three types of contract arrangements between farm-
ers and end-users: leasing, profit sharing, and fixed price contracts.79 For
instance, they argue that the farmer’s choice of biomass contract design
varies with their level of risk aversion.80 The higher their level of aversion,
the more likely the farmers are to prefer the fixed lease contract design. In
70 Id. at 783.
71 Id. at 781, 783–89.
72 Id. at 784.
73 Jody M. Endres et al., Building Bio-based Supply Chains: Theoretical Perspectives on
Innovative Contract Design, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 72, 72 (2013).
74 Id. at 72–73, 117–19.
75 Yang et al., supra note 31, at 29.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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connection to their findings, the authors suggest that a biomass end-user
or biorefinery will prefer to be more vertically integrated in two situations.81
First, a biorefinery will grow its own crop when biomass yield and price
risks are high, which will allow the biorefinery to avoid paying a high risk
premium to risk averse farmers.82 Second, vertical integration would be
preferred when the variability in returns to crop production is high, and
risk averse farmers would be more willing to choose leasing the land for
energy crop production.83
Finally, Dajun Yue et al. examined the challenges and opportunities
in modeling and optimizing biomass to bioenergy supply chains and petro-
leum supply chains.84 The authors highlight the supply chain design for
biomass, and the key challenges involving the transportation network and
the location of the biorefinery.85 The authors also note that uniqueness
of biofuel supply chains, given the raw material acquisition, and trans-
portation and collection stages. The authors point out that, because bio-
mass is cost-prohibitive and unstable for long-distance transport, given
its low energy density and high water content, a “circle around the biomass
supplier is often specified as the feasible region for building biomass
processing facilities.”86
B. Organizational Forms in the Bioenergy Industry
In considering the different costs and benefits of choosing one
organizational form over the other, the different theoretical approaches
discussed above intend to identify the costs and benefits of the choices
existing in the spectrum between producing a good yourself, or turning
to the market to purchase it at a certain price and risk. In like manner, the
theory of transaction cost economics (“TCE”) emphasizes transaction costs
as principal determinants of an industry’s organization and operations,
asserting that firms exist to minimize transaction costs.87 Transaction
costs consist of ordinary production costs, such as those associated with
land, materials, and supplies, but they also include costs related to admin-
istering ongoing business relationships, such as the costs of negotiating
81 Yang et al., supra note 31, at 29–30.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 30.
84 Yue et al., supra note 14, at 36.
85 Id. at 43.
86 Id. at 45.
87 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,
87 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 548, 556–58 (1981) [hereinafter The Economics of Organization].
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and writing efficient contracts, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing
the implementation of such contracts.88 TCE suggests that there are cir-
cumstances where costs associated with market transactions may favor
hierarchies (or in-house production), while in other cases, such costs may
favor “going to the market” as an economic governance structure.89
The most relevant feature of TCE is the notion that parties will
align transactions with different attributes and different alternative gov-
ernance structures to achieve a transaction cost economizing result.90
TCE suggests that when contracting costs exceed external procurement
costs, parties are more likely to vertically integrate.91 One of the reasons
is because vertical integration can meet the contractual needs of the
parties without posing hold-up problems.92 Consequently, the choice of
the optimal governance structure emerges to reduce the cost of partici-
pating in the market, meaning to reduce the costs incurred in making an
economic exchange.93
Some of the following characteristics should be considered when
identifying the nature of transaction costs: (1) the extent of uncertainty
present; (2) whether one or more of the parties involved are required to
make specific investments in the transaction (i.e., sunk investments);
(3) the economies of scale and scope associated to the transaction; and
(4) the reputational constraints.94 The consequence of these factors in
contracting and vertically integrated models will be discussed below.
1. Costs and Benefits Associated with Contractual Arrangements
Contracts facilitate parties’ efforts in maximizing the “contractual
surplus” from their transaction.95 The contractual surplus can be defined
88 Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-
Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J. L. ECO. & ORG. 33, 36 (1985). See generally The
Economics of Organization, supra note 87, at 552 (exemplifying the idea of transaction
costs as “[t]he economic counterpart of friction,” where relevant questions are whether “the
parties to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings
and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns, and other malfunction?”).
89 See id. at 558.
90 Id. at 573–74.
91 Id. at 558.
92 Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1983) [hereinafter Credible Commitments].
93 Joskow, supra note 88, at 36 (noting that the different organizational choices are a
consequence of firms seeking to minimize transaction costs).
94 Id. at 36–37.
95 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L. J. 541, 544 (2003).
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as the joint-gains of parties in connection with entering the contractual
relationship, such as reducing risks associated with the market.96 Like-
wise, contract theory focuses mainly on two functions of contracts: mini-
mizing contract risks and risk sharing.97 When transaction costs are low,
contracts can minimize opportunistic behavior and the risk of default by
controlling or encouraging certain actions within the framework of the
contract.98 Contracts allow parties to either enter into an inflexible relation-
ship, meaning a contract where one party tries to address every possible
outcome and eliminate risk, or more flexible relationships, where parties
would be allowed to tailor transactions to their future needs.99 Further-
more, long-term contracts, as opposed to short-term contracts or spot
market transactions, help parties to reduce opportunism and hold-up prob-
lems.100 A hold-up problem exists when parties to a future contract make
ex ante “non-contractible specific investments” in order to prepare for the
contracted transaction.101 Since the precise terms for an optimal contract
“cannot be specified with certainty ex ante,” there is a possibility that one
of the parties may act opportunistically.102
Long-term contracts alleviate hold-up problems because parties may
amortize their investments throughout the duration of the contract.103
Long-term contracts may also serve the needs of the parties involved when
a reputation factor plays an important role, such as causing parties to
fear losing future trade.104 Consequently, reputational effects can also pro-
vide ex ante incentives, as well as ex post safeguards for contracts where
specific investments exist.105 Despite the benefits of entering a contrac-
tual relationship, diseconomies associated with contracts increase when
96 Id.
97 JAMES MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AER-837, CONTRACTS, MARKETS AND
PRICES: ORGANIZING THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES v (2004);
see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 95, at 545 (noting that “contract law should [also] attempt
to facilitate efficient trade and investment.”).
98 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 98.
99 William P. Rogerson, Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 777, 777 (1992).
100 Joskow, supra note 88, at 48.
101 Rogerson, supra note 99, at 777.
102 Id.
103 Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, Incentives to Invest in Short-term vs. Long-term
Contracts: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1, 27 (Ecole d’economie de Toulouse, Work-
ing Paper No. 09-136, 2009) (arguing that increase in contract duration increases both
investment and effort, and consequently production).
104 Ola Kvaloy, Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration, 109 SCAND. J. ECON. 551, 552
(2007).
105 Id.
592 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:575
uncertainty and complexity becomes a substantial part of the parties’
relationship.106 Real world contracts are intrinsically deficient, and parties
may be able to take advantage of the agreed upon contract and appropriate
some of the return on the transacting partner’s relationship-specific invest-
ments.107 When the risk of hold-up and parties acting opportunistically
is present in a nascent market such as the bioenergy industry, and one
side perceives the threat of hold-up from the other party before entering the
contract, the party will likely not contract, or it will decide to underinvest,
creating transaction costs and barriers to entry and efficient contracting.108
In typical agricultural contracts, contracting may be a way of reducing
risks that are inherent to agricultural production, such as the risk related
to managing the machinery, and production risks, such as the quality of
the crops and insurance in the case of weather-related conditions.109
Contracting for biomass production, however, involves several
unique issues.110 Dedicated bioenergy crops, such as switchgrass and mis-
canthus, require a large amount of multi-year capital investment by farm-
ers in order to be established, and also require an initial establishment
period for the crop, specific machinery, and appropriate management
techniques.111 The costs of producing biomass depend greatly on how this
feedstock is managed and procured by the purchaser.112 Additionally, the
quality and quantity of biomass feedstock required may be specific for a
certain locality or biorefinery, which will tie farmers to that specific biore-
finery and buyer of the feedstock. When the farmer makes specific invest-
ments to supply the needs for a specific buyer of the feedstock, the buyer
knows that the next best value for the biomass in the market will be
lower.113 Hence, another cost that should be accounted for is the cost related
to the dependency of the biomass feedstock.
106 Joskow, supra note 88, at 37.
107 Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 310–13 (1978).
108 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 116.
109 Christopher R. Kelley, Agricultural Production Contracts: Drafting Considerations,18
HAMLINE L. REV. 397, 401 (1995) (noting that production contracts “are an important device
for acquiring supplies and reducing the risks inherent in agricultural production.”).
110 Goeringer et al., supra note 31, at 74.
111 Id. at 73; see Yang et al., supra note 31, at 29 (discussing the need for larger investments
in specific assets where uncertainty in a market exists).
112 Abhishek Shah, Costs of Biomass Energy and Biomass Plant Investment—Wide Range,
GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/03
/09/costs-of-biomass-energy-and-biomass-plant-investment-wide-range/.
113 George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman, Marketing Co-operatives: An Incomplete
Contracting Perspective, 52 J. AGRIC. ECON. 53, 54–55 (2001).
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Likewise, biomass end-users, especially in this early stage of the
bioenergy industry’s development, need a reliable supply of feedstock.114
Otherwise, the investment for producing the bioenergy will be simply lost.
Therefore, while typical agricultural contracts and biomass production con-
tracts may share similar terms, important differences between the two in-
dustries may cause biomass contracting to be suboptimal and not efficient
enough to give participants in the industry the growth incentives it needs.
As noted above, Jody M. Endres et al. argue for a vertically coordi-
nated, rather than a vertically integrated, bioenergy industry. The authors
define “vertical integration” as the industry structure where one party
“owns and operates all levels of the value chain,” including the land.115
For that reason, they first argue that vertically integrated industry models
have limited feasibility, especially in the Midwest of the United States be-
cause of the high value and ownership dispersion of the land.116 Differ-
ently, in this work, we consider vertical integration to also encompass the
high levels of control an industry has over its supply chain. In other words,
we consider vertical integration in different levels that would optimize an
otherwise merely independent relationship between the seller and buyer
of biomass. In this Article, we consider vertical integration as the situa-
tion where the firm (in this case the end-user of the biomass) exercises
more extensive control over more than one stage of the supply chain.117
Biomass crops are developed throughout the contiguous United States,
where values and land ownership differ. In any case, there are alterna-
tives to ownership of the land, in which biorefineries stand in a position
of control similar to a pure vertically integrated industry. For instance,
it may be the case that the biomass end-user rents the land (just as many
small-scale farmers typically do), and produces the feedstock itself by em-
ploying farmers that either have the experience, or acquire the requisite
knowledge, to produce biomass feedstock themselves. This means that,
despite having control over the production, the end-user will not incur
extensive investments in acquiring the know-how of how to plant, harvest,
or collect the biomass feedstock. Nevertheless, because of vertical integra-
tion, extensive control is exercised to correct market imperfections. We will
discuss market imperfections and the implications of vertical integration
throughout this work.
114 Goeringer et al., supra note 31, at 73.
115 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 81.
116 Id.
117 Id.; see Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical
Integration, 69 YALE L. J. 1, 2–4 (1959) (discussing how vertical integration improves
coordination and reduces costs).
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Second, Jody M. Endres et al. also argue that vertical coordination
would be a better model because it “does not disturb traditional agricul-
tural practices.”118 We will discuss findings from traditional agricultural
contracts that show that many of the disputes today revolve around fail-
ure to deliver the crop for reasons that mainly cannot be contracted around.
Management flexibility in the bioenergy industry may seem beneficial at
first, but because of evidence of asset specificity and the uniqueness of the
biomass feedstock in the short and long-terms, too much flexibility will re-
sult in large costs for both parties. As we will discuss, despite the benefits
contracting arrangements bring to agricultural relationships, evidence
from traditional industry disputes and current contractual efforts suggest
that traditional contracting arrangements that may be adequate to tradi-
tional crops may not be the optimal choice for specialized investments in
the bioenergy industry. That is because it is not only impossible to con-
sider all the potential issues that could arise, but it is impossible to know
the best responses to issues that do arise. Therefore, at least in the initial
stage of the industry’s development, contractual risks may move the orga-
nizational structure choice closer to a more vertically integrated model.
Asset specificity is a crucial transactional cost variable in the contractual
analysis, and will be discussed in detail below.119
2. Costs and Benefits Associated with Vertical Integration
Vertical integration is one of the options for supply chain organi-
zations. According to Oliver Williamson, “[o]nly as market-mediated con-
tracts break down are the transactions in question removed from markets
and organized internally.”120 TCE suggests that costs and difficulties asso-
ciated with market transactions sometimes favor hierarchies (or in-house
production), instead of contracts, as an economic governance structure.121
Vertical integration is a response to market transaction costs where dif-
ferent stages of the industry supply chain coordinate to align the interests
and needs of the parties.122 Vertical integration can be defined as the “firm’s
118 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 81–82.
119 See The Economics of Organization, supra note 87, at 555 (noting that “[a]sset specificity
is both the most important dimension for describing transactions . . . .”).
120 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 87 (New York: Free Press 1985).
121 Daron Acemoglu et al., Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and
Contracting Costs, 64 J. FIN. 1251, 1251–52 (2009).
122 John Stuckey & David White, When and When Not to Vertically Integrate, MCKINSEY
& CO. (Aug. 1993), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/when_and_when_not_to
_vertically_integrate, archived at http://perma.cc/E5S3-BBAZ.
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ownership of vertically related activities.”123 Vertical integration can also
be defined as the case where the firm controls more than one stage of the
production process in order to reduce inefficiencies.124
Vertical integration combines a specific asset and the activity that
utilizes the asset within a single firm in order to internalize and eliminate
the incentives for ex post opportunism that contracts present.125 In other
words, “[v]ertical integration encourages specific investments and reduces
holdup problems” in imperfect markets.126 One of the reasons for integra-
tion is to respond to market risks where contracts designed to overcome
such risks are costly and fail to operate as expected by parties. Studies
have confirmed a preference for vertical integration when contracts are
necessarily incomplete, and contracting costs are high.127 Other reasons
for integration are to enter and develop a new share of the market, and to
guarantee supply of inputs.128 In this sense, vertical integration in the
bioenergy industry means that the biomass end-user or biorefinery will
grow its own biomass feedstock. The degree of vertical integration is mea-
sured by the extent of the firm’s ownership over successive stages of the
supply chain for its input, and it may vary according to the type of industry,
and parties and interests involved.129
When an industry faces the choice between contracting or verti-
cally integrating, the latter will be desirable where transaction costs asso-
ciated with this industry’s input contracts increase, and correspondent
incentives for contracting parties to act in accordance with the contract
decrease.130 The concern is that there is room for inefficient behavior when
substantial specific investments are involved, and uncertainty makes it
difficult to clearly stipulate important terms in the contract addressing
these specific investments.131 Through vertical integration, TCE argues
123 See ROBERT M. GRANT, CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY ANALYSIS: TEXT AND CASES, INKLING,
354 (7th ed. 2010).
124 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 81; see Kessler & Stern, supra note 117, at 1–4 (noting
the benefits of vertical integration in reducing transaction costs).
125 Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Con-
siderations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 112, 117 (1971) [hereinafter The Vertical Integration
of Production].
126 Acemoglu et al., supra note 121, at 1251.
127 See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 88, at 54 (finding that coal supply transactions for mine-
mouth plants are much more likely to be integrated or make use of complex long-term
contracts because of the presence of asset specificity).
128 Stuckey & White, supra note 122, at 114.
129 See Klein et al., supra note 107, at 301 (noting that “costs of contractually specifying
all important elements of quality varies considerably by type of asset.”).
130 See The Economics of Organization, supra note 87, at 558.
131 Id.
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that internalizing the decision-making within the company is an efficient
response to the asset specificity problem.132 In the bioenergy industry, the
certainty of an adequate supply of the biomass feedstock is a concern for
the biomass end-user. Ownership of the biomass feedstock and control
over the production are ways to decrease and remove any dependency on
farmers. Another benefit of vertical integration is that it may mitigate the
hold-up problem.133 Parties will be discouraged from making specific invest-
ments if such investment may be wasted or expropriated.134 Thus, with ver-
tical integration, incentives to act opportunistically are mitigated, and
costs of bargaining and asymmetric information are internalized to the
firm. The importance of considering the possibility of opportunistic be-
havior when specific investments are made will be considered below.
While vertical integration encourages investments in industries
that require specific investments and reduces such costs when contracts
are imperfect, there are diseconomies associated with vertically integrated
industries.135 For instance, internalizing and managing transactions im-
poses administrative costs.136 In the case of the bioenergy industry, from
the perspective of the biomass end-user, integration means acquiring the
land, the farmer’s know-how, and the equipment and infrastructure to
grow the crops. Such costs should be taken into consideration in the de-
cision to integrate. Vertical integration is also less desirable when the as-
sets are less specific.137 In the absence of asset specificity, inefficiencies
from administrative costs make production less efficient than buying the
needed product in the open market.138
Another concern with vertical integration is related “to extend[ing]
a monopoly position at one stage of an industry’s value chain to adjacent
stages.”139 Vertical integration limits the ability of new companies to enter
132 Id.
133 See Kessler & Stern, supra note 117, at 2–5 (discussing the importance of control in
vertical integration and how it eliminates the threat of non-renewal).
134 See Klein et al., supra note 107, at 301 (noting that less specific investments will be
made to avoid opportunism).
135 See Michael H. Riordan & Oliver E. Williamson, Asset Specificity and Economic
Organization, 3 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 365, 375 (1985) (citing bureaucratic cost and entry
impediments as examples of diseconomies vertical integration).
136 See Grant, supra note 123, at 357–58 (discussing administrative costs imposed by
vertical integration).
137 See Riordan & Williamson, supra note 135, at 367 (noting that “[t]ransactions that are
supported by non-specific (redeployable) investments are ones for which neoclassical
analysis is well-suited to deal”).
138 See Grant, supra note 123, at 352, 356–58 (discussing when vertical integration may
be an inefficient choice); see also Klein et al., supra note 107, at 298 (noting that as assets
become more specific the costs of contracting in the market will increase).
139 Grant, supra note 123, at 357–58.
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the market.140 Thereby, the anticompetitive effects are usually of two types:
(1) price discrimination; and (2) barriers to entry.141 Price discrimination
can be exercised in any industry arrangement, but the argument is that it
is the cost of enforcing terms of the contract that are at issue in vertical
integration.142 “Some commodities . . . have self-enforcing properties,”
meaning that reselling the commodity cannot be arranged unnoticed.143
It is the absence of self-enforcing properties that would make vertical in-
tegration an attractive mechanism to accomplish discrimination.144 In
terms of barriers to entry, vertical integration is said to have the poten-
tial of increasing capital requirements, and companies may use vertical
integration as a way to increase finance requirements and discourage
potential entrants.145 Finally, vertical integration may be disadvantageous
in providing a quick response to a change in the industry, such as to
promptly respond to requests from the market for a new product develop-
ment that would require technical capabilities that were wiped out by the
process of vertical integration.146 At the same time, vertical integration,
however, may allow for even better “coordination in achieving” more effi-
cient “simultaneous adjustment throughout the vertical chain.”147
Therefore, the contracting and vertical integration models provide
different benefits and incentives, and they involve different costs. Whether
ownership or stronger control over the supply chain is better than contract-
ing, or, putting it a different way, whether vertical integration is the ideal
choice, will depend on a different set of conditions related to given transac-
tions, mainly the organizational benefits and costs of integrating. As we
will argue below, transaction costs and asset specificity in the nascent
bioenergy industry make it a prime candidate for vertical integration.
C. The Dimensions of Asset Specificity
As discussed above, contracts allow parties to share risks and reduce
hold-up and opportunistic behavior. However, the parties cannot contract
around every problem, nor foresee every problem. Vertical integration
140 The Vertical Integration of Production, supra note 125, at 118–19.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 119.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Grant, supra note 123, at 358 (illustrating with the example that “[e]xtensive
outsourcing has been a key feature of fast-cycle product development throughout the
electronics sector.”).
147 Id. (noting the success of American Apparel in its coordinated vertical integration that
allowed a fast design-to-distribution cycle).
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eliminates inefficiencies related to contracts, but increases administrative
costs. Both organizational arrangements present disadvantages in re-
sponding to market inefficiencies, and the objective becomes to select the
arrangement that can better respond to the specific industry’s needs. We
argue here that the presence of asset specificity in the biomass industry
makes vertical integration the optimal choice to respond to likely issues
that asset specificity may create for biomass producers and end-users.
TCE highlights the importance of asset specificity, and suggests
that the level of asset specificity involved in a firm’s transactions is one of
the main factors in its choice of governance structure.148 That is because,
as the assets necessary for a transaction become more specific, “the aggre-
gation benefits of markets . . . are reduced and exchange takes on a pro-
gressively stronger bilateral character.”149 Asset specificity denotes the
extent to which an asset that is deployed in a specific activity loses value
when used in another activity than the one initially intended.150 “[T]he ex-
istence of asset specificity means that [a market actor’s] bargaining posi-
tion will depend on which assets he has access to,” which would make him
more “sensitive to the allocation of asset ownership.”151 In other words, in
the presence of asset specificity, more investments by the parties mean
greater bilateral dependence between otherwise independent actors. How-
ever, if the transaction is characterized by low asset specificity, “parties
can rely on low switching costs and the threat of market competition” to
function as a constraint to ex post opportunistic behavior during the dura-
tion of the contract.152
Generally, asset specificity has been divided into six different di-
mensions: (1) site specificity; (2) dedicated asset specificity; (3) physical
asset specificity; (4) human asset specificity; (5) temporal specificity; and
(6) brand name capital.153 Only the first five dimensions of asset specific-
ity matter under our analysis because the bioenergy industry has yet to
develop to the point where brand name capital is significantly important.
First of all, site specificity is considered high when the location of the
products necessary for a transaction is important. Location concerns create
148 Riordan & Williamson, supra note 135, at 366.
149 The Economics of Organization, supra note 87, at 558.
150 See Klein et al., supra note 107, at 298–99 (illustrating the concept with the printing
press example).
151 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119, 1122 (1990).
152 Brian J.M. Quinn, Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Study of @Home
Corporation, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 77, 82 (2010).
153 Ritu Lohtia, What Constitutes a Transaction-Specific Asset? An Examination of the
Dimensions and Types, 30 J. BUS. RESEARCH 261, 262–63 (1994).
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dependency between parties because, when site specificity is high, trade
partners tend to build their business close to each other.154 In addition, site
specificity is high when goods can only be moved at a significant cost.155
Second, dedicated asset specificity is high when investments are made to
meet the demands of specific trading partners and parties must make spe-
cific investments in order to produce and exchange.156 Third, physical asset
specificity exists when particular investments, such as machinery and
design, are made to meet the demands of a specific trading partner.157 Con-
sequently, physical asset specificity is high when the transaction involves
a unique product and assets are tailored to meet the needs of a particular
partner. Fourth, temporal asset specificity means that timing is critical
to the transaction.158 Temporal asset specificity will be high when timing
of the use of the product is important.159 Finally, human asset specificity
means investment in personnel, such as investments to learn how to make
a new product.160 Therefore, human asset specificity is high when parties
must acquire specialized knowledge in order to produce to sell.
An asset specific investment has two primary characteristics. First,
the investment is made in anticipation of the transaction.161 Second, the
assets created in consequence of the transaction have values attached to
their specific use, location, the counterparty’s hand, etc.162 Consequently,
in the presence of an asset specific investment, each party essentially has
a monopoly over the other party with specific assets because the product
has a value inside the relationship, but much lower or no value outside
the transaction.163
Additionally, if parties make joint investments, meaning each
makes asset specific investments, we have a situation where joint
gains are contingent on the cooperation of all parties involved.164 In this
case, if parties can successfully coordinate the investments for a common
goal, both will benefit. However, because parties have incentives to act
154 Credible Commitments, supra note 92, at 526.
155 Id.
156 Joskow, supra note 88, at 38.
157 Id.
158 Applying Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 68, at 109.
159 See id.
160 See Joskow, supra note 88, at 38.
161 Quinn, supra note 152, at 79.
162 Id.
163 See Joskow, supra note 88, at 38 (noting that “transaction-specific sunk investments gen-
erate a stream of potentially appropriable quasi-rents equal to the difference between the an-
ticipated value in the use to which the investments were committed and the next best use.”).
164 Quinn, supra note 152, at 80.
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opportunistically and free ride off joint investments, the result in such situ-
ations is that no one cooperates.165 Therefore, asset specific investments,
either individually or jointly made in a specific transaction, appear to
present more challenges than opportunities for the parties involved.
The notion of asset specificity helps us to identify the costs of the
assets associated with a supply chain.166 Predictions based on asset spec-
ificity are supported by data from existing contracts in the industry, facts
concerning how the bioenergy industry works, and previous studies done
on asset specificity.167 For instance, after a review of 100 studies across
a range of sectors, substantial evidence was found that the following fac-
tors increase the presence of vertical integration: (1) greater specificity
of physical capital and human capital; (2) more dedicated and more com-
plex assets; (3) greater site specificity; and (4) greater uncertainty about
demand.168
In summary, the presence of asset specificity modifies the value of
assets in alternative uses, and market competition cannot as efficiently
combat potential ex post opportunism.169 Whether a transaction involves
asset specificity or not is a crucial determination so that the industry can
better organize itself to capture efficiency gains in a transaction. In gen-
eral, industries involving transactions characterized by high levels of
asset specificity will benefit from higher levels of vertical integration.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSET SPECIFICITY IN THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE BIOENERGY INDUSTRY
Before delving into our empirical analysis, it is important to con-
sider some key issues affecting biomass supply chains and the impact of
asset specificity on the developing bioenergy industry.
A. The Biomass Supply Chain: Main Aspects
The desired biomass supply chain is the one that most efficiently
answers the question of “[h]ow many gallons of biofuel does it take to grow
165 Id.
166 See generally Riordan & Williamson, supra note 135, at 366 (arguing that “production
and transaction costs both need to be taken into account in any effort to realize a broadly
conceived economizing result.”).
167 See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 88, at 54 (finding that coal supply transactions for mine-
mouth plants are much more likely to be integrated or make use of complex long-term con-
tracts because of the presence of asset specificity); Altman & Johnson, supra note 24, at 28–
34 (utilizing transaction cost economics to address organizational issues in this industry).
168 Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The
Evidence, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 653–59 (2007).
169 See Applying Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 68, at 109.
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and process enough biomass to make a gallon of biofuel?”170 The biomass
supply chain refers to the flow of feedstock from the land to its eventual
end use, in which the biomass passes through a series of processes.171 The
different stages of the biomass supply chain require unique sets of knowl-
edge and technology, encompassing the growing, harvesting, transporting,
aggregating, storing, and conversion of biomass.172
In terms of producing and growing the biomass, different crops and
types of biomass require different methods. Dedicated energy crops, such
as perennial grasses, can be grown on farms in large quantities and as
double crops that fit into rotations with food crops.173 Woody biomass in-
cludes bark, sawdust, and other byproducts of milling timber and making
paper, as well as shavings that are produced during the manufacture of
wood products and organic sludge from pulp and paper mills.174 Biomass
material also includes residues, such as branches, treetops, and commod-
ity crop wastes that can be collected for energy use.
As the bioenergy industry develops, the availability of and the de-
mand for different types of biomass will vary in each region of the coun-
try, and will depend, in great part, on the logistics of transporting and
storing the biomass material.175 Transportation mainly involves the
loading and unloading of the biomass feedstock, and its transfer from
pre-processing sites to the plant or biorefinery.176 Truck transport is most
commonly used to move feedstock, but the quality of the biomass and its
physical form will determine the type of equipment to be used to reduce
delivery costs.177 The reason why transport is usually costly is because most
agricultural biomass feedstocks have a lower energy density than fossil
fuels have.178 This means that when the biomass is not processed, it often
170 James H. Dooley, Engineering a Better Biomass Supply Chain, BIOMASS MAGAZINE
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/8585/engineering-a-better-biomass
-supply-chain, archived at http://perma.cc/4R52-BMFN.
171 See Williams, supra note 47.
172 See id.
173 See How Biomass Energy Works, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa
.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/how-biomass-energy-works.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/ACK3-FYME (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
174 Id.
175 Logistics of a Biopower Plant, supra note 48.
176 Salman Zafar, How is Biomass Transported, BIOENERGY CONSULT (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.bioenergyconsult.com/biomass-transportation/, archived at http://perma.cc
/ARG2-ZGGS.
177 Id. (noting that pipelines are another option that can also be employed to transport
biomass).
178 See How Biomass Energy Works, supra note 173 (discussing energy density in biomass
energy systems).
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will not be cost-effectively shipped more than 50–100 miles by truck be-
fore it is converted into fuel or energy.179 For that reason, it is usually
better to develop biorefineries closer to the location where the feedstock
is generated.180
Additionally, biorefineries require sufficient volumes of feedstock
throughout the year at a suitable quality specification, and because some
of the feedstocks are not grown year around, biomass must be stored to ac-
commodate the continuous need for energy production. The cost of stor-
age is an essential element to the feasibility of the biomass supply chain,
and the type of storage to be employed depends on the type and quality of
biomass.181 In the case of high-moisture biomass, wet-storage systems
would likely be required in order to avoid the degradation of the feed-
stock.182 Consequently, the biomass characteristics will also be affected by
the storage method utilized by the party.183
Therefore, the biomass feedstock must be handled and transported
along the supply chain, which must be done as cheaply as possible to limit
overall costs of bioenergy.184 Accordingly, whether the biomass comes from
dedicated crops or woody materials, the cost of collection is always an
important factor, and human effort, machinery, and energy inputs can
have a substantial impact on the cost of the biomass that is delivered to
the end-user.185
B. The Biomass Supply Chain: Asset Specificity
As previously discussed, it is argued that vertical integration is
generally the optimal arrangement choice when the assets necessary for a
transaction are highly specific.186 When taking into account the five rele-
vant dimensions of asset specificity, the bioenergy industry appears to be
a suitable candidate for vertical integration. For example, in terms of site
179 Id.
180 Zafar, supra note 48.
181 Id.
182 Salman Zafar, Biomass Storage Methods, BIOENERGY CONSULT (Oct. 14, 2013), http://
www.bioenergyconsult.com/biomass-storage/, archived at http://perma.cc/ARG2-ZGGS.
183 Williams, supra note 47.
184 Id.
185 Logistics of a Biopower Plant, supra note 48.
186 Lohtia, supra note 153, at 262 (“[W]hen highly specific assets are present, inter-firm
coordination costs increased tremendously, giving vertical integration a transaction cost
advantage over markets or hybrids.”); see generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (providing
an extensive discussion of the role of asset specificity in the integration decision).
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asset specificity, Ferchichi’s study of the bioethanol industry in Europe187
and Altman’s study of the biopower industry in the United States188 both
show that shorter transportation distance leads to a higher likelihood of
integration as opposed to contracting for biomass feedstocks. That is
because, in the presence of dedicated energy crops, site specificity is high
mainly because many biomass end-users or biorefineries are feedstock
specific, and the desired characteristics of the feedstock will depend on
local climate and the soil conditions of a particular area.189 Because of
considerable transportation costs, biorefineries would prefer to be in close
proximity to the desired crops.190 That is also because, in the current bio-
mass industry, the feedstock tolerances for high or low moisture, weath-
ering, mold, and other contaminants may vary significantly depending on
the technology used to convert the biomass into energy.191 Site specificity
also determines transportation costs of dedicated crops, because such costs
depend on the distance traveled, the energy density of the biomass, the
type of biomass, and the form in which it is being transported.192
Another factor influencing site specificity for the bioenergy industry
is current federal policy and the economic feasibility of transporting eth-
anol.193 For instance, in order for biofuels to qualify for meeting the RFS’s
mandates, they must meet certain greenhouse gas emission reduction
thresholds.194 The RFS’s regulatory regime accounts for emissions from
187 See Monia Ferchichi & Loïc Sauvée, Modeling the Choice of the Organizational Form
in the European Bioethanol Industry, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/down
load.cgi?db_name=CEA2010&paper_id=225, archived at https://perma.cc/ZZ3L-CEFW
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
188 See Ira Altman et al., Scale and Transaction Costs in the U.S. Biopower Industry, 5
J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 15 (2007).
189 See McKendry, supra note 37, at 38 (noting the characteristics of dedicated energy crops).
190 See id. at 44.
191 Susanne Retka Schill, Organizing Biomass Farmers, BIOMASS MAGAZINE, http://bio
massmagazine.com/articles/1528/organizing-biomass-farmers, archived at http://perma.cc
/THV9-JMDB (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
192 McKendry, supra note 37, at 44.
193 COMM. ON ECON. & ENVTL. IMPACTS OF INCREASING BIOFUELS PRODUCTION, NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
OF U.S. BIOFUEL POLICY (2011), available at http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets
/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Renewable-Fuel-Standard-Final.pdf (noting
that some key factors that influence environmental effects from producing feedstocks for
biofuels are site specificity and incentives created by greenhouse laws).
194 See Sanya Carley et al., Innovation in the Auto Industry: The Role of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 367, 377 (2011) (discussing the
Environmental Protection Agency’s role in limiting the amount of greenhouse gases that
are associated with the lifecycle of biofuels production and use).
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all aspects of production of the biofuel, including transportation of biomass
from the fields to the biorefinery. Additionally, biomass crops are used as
fuel, so spending too much fuel to transport these plants to a conversion
facility is economically unfeasible. Therefore, economic feasibility and the
standards established by the RFS limit the feasible distance between a
biofuel plant and the field the crops are grown on. Site specificity, how-
ever, is less strict for biomass crops not used for biofuels since the renew-
able fuel standard is no longer a factor.195
The level of dedicated asset specificity impacts both farmers and
biomass end-users. For farmers, different types of biomass crops require
more specific equipment than others. Dedicated bioenergy crops require
long-term investments, and the harvesting of the biomass represents one
of the most significant factors in the cost of production of biomass energy
crops.196 The harvesting costs will depend on the biomass and the costs nec-
essary to produce a feedstock suitable for the biomass conversion process
that is used by the biorefinery.197 In areas where the equipment used to
harvest, package, and transport the biomass is the same as for the crops
farmers traditionally cultivate, the level and importance of dedicated asset
specificity will be lower.198 However, the opposite is true for areas where
the equipment used to harvest, package, and transport the biomass will
have to be specifically purchased for the purpose of cultivating and har-
vesting the energy crop.
For the biorefinery, dedicated asset specificity is influenced by
how easily the biorefinery can be retooled and used to produce energy for
alternate biomass feedstocks.199 In general, dedicated asset specificity
will likely be considered high for the biorefinery owner because even if
it does retool to utilize other feedstocks, it would have to either use crops
grown in the area or convince farmers to grow new crops. Biorefineries
may also have other production issues as they need to also address
sustainability concerns.200
The level of physical asset specificity depends on the particular
type of biomass feedstock, as some may have more alternative uses than
195 See id.
196 McKendry, supra note 37, at 44.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See INTEGRATED BIOREFINERIES, supra note 54 (discussing efforts to diversify the
feedstocks used in biorefineries).
200 Eustermann & Thompson, supra note 59 (discussing the production issues in a bio-
refinery).
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others.201 For the biorefinery, physical asset specificity will be high if its
conversion process is feedstock specific. Also, there is typically a high level
of physical asset specificity because some biomass is easier to process into
liquid biofuel than others, and climate and soil type varies and determines
types and amounts of biomass that can be grown in different geographic
areas.202 As noted above, biofuel plants that use a particular type of feed-
stock, therefore, would need to be close to the area where that crop grows.203
Currently, efforts are being made to make biofuel plants feedstock neutral
so they can accept different types of feedstock, but until then, physical
asset specificity remains high for most biofuel plants.204
Furthermore, it can be the case that farmers grow specialized crops
that can only be used for the generation of biofuels.205 When this is true,
there is a high level of physical asset specificity. With dedicated energy
crops, physical asset specificity will also be high for the farmer if the prod-
uct is unique and has a very limited market. The lack of an appropriate
supply-side industry brings risks to the development of biomass relation-
ships, and can have a detrimental effect on the successful financing and
operation of biomass processing facilities.206 In such cases, if the biore-
finery has tighter design specific conditions, the unexpected change of
farmers will be costly, or even deadly, leading biomass end-users and bio-
refineries to idle capacity.
Finally, the level of human asset specificity also largely depends on
the type of biomass crop being used. Some biomass crops are easier to grow
than others and for novel biomass crops, optimal cultivation practices have
yet to be developed. In cases where agricultural residue is used, there are
low levels of human asset specificity.
In conclusion, the levels of asset specificity vary according to the
circumstances of a given biomass transaction because different biomass
201 See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 11–13 (discussing some of the different
feedstock available in the market).
202 Ethanol Feedstocks, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol
_feedstocks.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P4QA-ZJKM (last updated Dec. 12, 2013).
203 See id.
204 See INTEGRATED BIOREFINERIES, supra note 54 (highlighting that a “crucial step” of the
U.S. bioindustry is to develop “first-of-a-kind integrated biorefineries that are capable of
efficiently converting a broad range of biomass feedstocks into commercially viable biofuels,
biopower, and other bioproducts.”).
205 Other times the biofuel plants simply use agricultural residue from crops which are
normally grown; and the farmer is simply selling the unharvested portions of the crop to
the biofuel plant. In these cases there is a low level of physical asset specificity.
206 Eustermann & Thompson, supra note 59 (discussing the problems generated by the
lack of a supply side in the biomass industry).
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products suit different situations. In general, however, the bioenergy in-
dustry has many of the characteristics that reflect the presence of asset
specificity.207 As noted above, there are costs related to biomass end-users
cultivating their own feedstock, but in the presence of high asset specific-
ity and uncertainties related to supply, the costs and risks of going to the
market for biomass feedstocks may surpass the costs of vertically inte-
grating. One of the factors to be analyzed is the presence or absence of
asset specificity concerns. As we will see below, asset specificity will lead
to important considerations for the overall organization of the nascent
bioenergy industry, and in favor of a more vertically integrated structure.
C. The Miscanthus Example
Giant Miscanthus (“miscanthus”) is a perennial grass that is one of
the most promising energy crops for the production of cellulosic biofuels.208
It makes efficient use of soil nutrients, and it is known for its high yields—
up to fifteen tons of dry matter per acre.209 Miscanthus has also been rec-
ommended for use in combined heat and power generation.210 Additionally,
researchers at the University of Illinois have found that miscanthus out-
performs current biofuel feedstocks, meaning that using miscanthus for
cellulosic biofuel production could significantly reduce the land use require-
ments necessary to accomplish the RFS’s goals.211
Miscanthus has been studied in the European Union, and it has
been commercialized there mainly for combustion in power plants.212 How-
ever, research in the United States is still developing to demonstrate the
true potential of miscanthus as a bioenergy feedstock.213 The study of
207 See Altman & Johnson, supra note 24, at 33 (noting that data in the bioenergy industry
is consistent with asset specificity features since firms with flexible technologies in this
industry reported lower levels of vertical integration); see McKendry, supra note 37, at 44.
208 Emily A. Heaton et al., Miscanthus (Miscanthus x giganteus) for Biofuel Production,
EXTENSION (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.extension.org/pages/26625/miscanthus-miscan thus
-x-giganteus-for-biofuel-production#.U-5WcvldVVI, archived at https://perma.cc/6VWR
-CJ47 (noting that miscanthus is a “new leading biomass crop in the United States.”).
209 Anna Simet, Masterminding Miscanthus, BIOMASS MAGAZINE (Jan. 25, 2014), http:
//biomassmagazine.com/articles/9937/masterminding-miscanthus, archived at http://perma
.cc/YZ9C-PFVA.
210 EMILY HEATON ET AL., IOWA STATE UNIV. DEPT. OF AGRONOMY, AG201, GIANT MIS-
CANTHUS FOR BIOMASS PRODUCTION (2010), available at https://store.extension.iastate.edu
/Product/Giant-Miscanthus-for-Biomass-Production.
211 Diana Yates, Miscanthus Can Meet U.S. Biofuels Goal Using Less Land than Corn or
Switchgrass, NEWS BUREAU ILL. (Jul. 30, 2008), http://news.illinois.edu/news/08/0730
miscanthus.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UJ6Z-HW7Y.
212 HEATON ET AL., supra note 210.
213 Id.
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miscanthus in the United States started at the University of Illinois in
Urbana–Champaign in 2001, and researchers are still struggling to find the
best method of propagation for miscanthus.214 There are two main methods
of establishing miscanthus in agricultural fields. First, rhizomes may be
used, which are horizontal-growing roots that can be divided by the root
and replanted to grow new miscanthus strands.215 Second, propagation
may occur through live plants (also called “plugs”).216 The difference be-
tween these two propagation methods for bioenergy is the cost.217 Tom
Voigt, who leads the feedstock production and agronomy program at the
University of Illinois’ Energy Biosciences Institute stated that, despite the
fact that the cost of plugs are generally higher than rhizomes, tests have
found that plugs have shown more uniform fields.218 Planting of the plugs
has been done with mechanical planters, which present similar charac-
teristics to vegetable transplanters. But when comparing planting mis-
canthus to planting vegetables, miscanthus has proven to be “fairly labor
intensive and expensive.”219 A mechanical planter especially developed
for miscanthus plugs could reduce the labor involved, but to this date, none
appears to have been developed.220 It has also been found that the costs
of producing miscanthus is high, especially in the first year, because of
pre-harvest machinery costs, and harvesting costs account for sixty-nine
percent of delivered cost of miscanthus from the third year on.221 Just as
with the lack of widely available machinery for the planting of miscanthus,
there is very little machinery available that is specifically designed for
the harvesting of miscanthus.
Miscanthus transactions provide a prime example of the high levels
of asset specificity involved in biomass procurement for biorefineries.
Imagine a new cellulosic biofuel production facility that is constructed in
an area and intends to use miscanthus as a feedstock. If the facility con-
tracts with biomass producers for its supply of miscanthus, asset specific-
ity will be exceptionally high for both parties to a given transaction. Site
specificity will be high because it will be necessary for the feedstock to be
cultivated in relatively close proximity to the biorefinery as a result of the
214 Id.
215 Simet, supra note 209.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. (noting Tom Voigt’s comment about plot establishment in many states, including
Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey and Virginia).
220 Id.
221 Madhu Khanna et al., Costs of Producing Miscanthus and Switchgrass for Bioenergy
in Illinois, 32 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 482, 488–89 (2008).
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logistical and cost issues discussed above. Dedicated asset specificity will
be high because the biorefinery has been constructed and designed to utilize
only miscanthus and the biomass producer might have to invest in storage
facilities and will also have to invest in machinery designed specifically for
the cultivation and harvesting of the miscanthus. Physical asset specificity
will be high for both the parties because the product that is the focus of the
transaction (i.e., the miscanthus) is a unique product, which the biore-
finery will be unable to acquire outside of the transaction and for which the
biomass producer also has no alternate market.
Likewise, human asset specificity will be high for both parties
because the biorefinery will have to invest in hiring employees and train-
ing them to operate the plant, and biomass producers will have to acquire
the requisite knowledge to cultivate and harvest this novel crop. Finally,
temporal specificity will be high because the biorefinery will need a con-
sistent, year-round supply of feedstock and the biomass producer will have
timing concerns since its risk of loss will increase proportionally to the time
it has to store the miscanthus prior to delivery.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM AGRICULTURAL DISPUTES AND
EXAMPLE BIOMASS CONTRACTS
In order to further examine the optimal biomass supply chain
organization for the developing bioenergy industry, we now undertake
two distinct empirical analyses. First, we present an empirical study of
agricultural contract arbitration cases collected from 2010–2013. While
these cases do not include any biomass-related disputes, the common dis-
putes litigated by farmers and respective contracting parties in agricultural
contracts will emphasize what are the most common issues in agricultural
contract disputes and provide important insight into what biomass produc-
ers and end-users may expect from their relationship. This study highlights
the fact that even in well-established markets such as those for commodity
corn and wheat, there are still difficulties in transacting relationships that
conventional and typical agricultural contracts cannot resolve.
Second, we analyze five, real-life, model contracts illustrating
different relationships in the bioenergy industry. We draw our analysis
based on how differing levels of asset specify in the sectors inform their
contractual provisions. This study will highlight the concerns that permeate
the industry, and our analysis seeks to assist parties in evaluating the best
way to organize the bioenergy industry in the United States.
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A. Lessons from Common Disputes in Agricultural Contracts
1. Methodology
Initially, we researched court cases concerning agricultural disputes
using Bloomberg Law.222 Early on, we noticed that few reported court cases
existed concerning agricultural disputes, and thus we decided to search
for arbitration decisions since typical agricultural contracts contain arbi-
tration provisions.223 After expanding our research to incorporate second-
ary sources in the Bloomberg Law database, several references indicated
that two main arbitrating bodies for crop production contracts exist. These
arbitrators are: (1) the American Arbitration Association (AAA); and (2)
the National Feed and Grain Association (NFGA). We were unable to find
relevant public arbitration decisions at the AAA website, but the NFGA
posts a large percentage of their decisions on their website, which enabled
us to find relevant cases.
Thus, we expanded our research to arbitrations and used the NFGA
Database to identify the relevant arbitration cases filed in three complete
calendar years: 2010, 2011, and 2012. We selected arbitration cases from
these three years because they reflect the most recent decisions, and there-
fore most accurately expose the current disputes in this market. There-
fore, the dataset assembled for this research includes information from
arbitration cases collected from the NFGA website. There were 52 reported
arbitration decisions in 2010, 30 decisions in 2011, and 26 in 2012. We
automatically discarded any references that awarded a default judgment
due to one party not appearing. This was due to the fact that these cases
provide no useful legal analysis and data for this research. The limitations
of this research are that it only includes cases that went to judgment, we
only analyzed dockets on non-state cases, and it excludes cases that are still
ongoing. We also did not include the related counter claims or appeals
because we only wanted to analyze final decisions.
After discarding the cases mentioned above, our arbitration dataset
consists of 41 relevant arbitration decisions. For each case, we reviewed
many variables.224 The arbitration decisions are divided into three sections:
222 We used variations of the following search string: “grain or feed or soy or poultry or
chicken or farmer or corn or bean or crop or pig or rancher or grower not bankruptcy not
loan not insurance.”
223 See Matthew L. Benda & Edward E. Beckmann, To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate: A
Practitioner’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Agricultural Context, 2 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 315, 316 (explaining that some of the benefits for parties are the impartiality
and quick results of arbitration procedures).
224 The variables examined in the arbitration decisions are: Plaintiff and Defendant types,
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Statement of the Case; the Decision; and the Award. We started by com-
paring each type of plaintiff and defendant. The “type of plaintiff” refers to
their role in the agricultural industry, such as elevators, miller, supplier,
and farmer. The majority of defendants were farmers. For the parties
involved, we checked the Statement of the Case to determine what they
were. For the reasoning analysis, we checked the Decision and the Award
sections of the case. To determine the nature of the dispute, we checked
the Statement of the Case.
2. Lessons from Agricultural Disputes
The types of parties involved in the disputes are: (1) large elevators,
traders or processors (i.e., grain elevators owned by large corporations
operating many facilities, typically worth hundreds of millions or several
billion dollars, such as Cargill, Inc. or the Andersons); (2) local elevators
(i.e., those that purchase large amounts of grain from local farmers for
resale later); (3) millers (i.e., end-users that convert the crops into food,
feed, or some other product); and (4) suppliers (i.e., entities that provide
feed, food, or other products to farmers and end-users, which do not seem
to have a location whose purpose is to buy grain from local farmers).
Our research found that plaintiffs won 73.17% of the time, especially
when the plaintiff was a large elevator, trader, or processor. In such cases,
the winning rates as plaintiff were more than eighty percent. Here, any
finding where the defendant was at fault was considered a victory for the
plaintiff, even if the damages requested were higher than the damages
awarded. Additionally, damages recorded were the amounts calculated
by the arbitrator for the alleged behavior and modifications due to with-
held payments or obligations from unrelated disputes that were ignored.
The following table summarizes these results:
TABLE 1
Type of Party
Party as
Plaintiff
Party as
Defendant
Wins as
Plaintiff
Wins as
Defendant
Large Elevator/
Trader/Processor
39.02% (16/41) 7.32% (3/41)
84.21%
(16/19)
100% (3/3)
Supplier 4.88% (2/41) 2.44 (1/41) 100% (3/3) 0% (0/2)
Miller 7.32% (3/41) 0% (0/41) 0% (0/3) N/A (0/0)
Complaint, Dispute, Crop, Amount, Requested Damages, Defense, Court Reasoning, Dam-
ages Granted and Damages Granted Reasoning.
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Type of Party
Party as
Plaintiff
Party as
Defendant
Wins as
Plaintiff
Wins as
Defendant
Elevator 31.71% (13/41) 4.88% (2/41)
84.62%
(11/13)
50% (1/2)
Farm:
Company/Co-op
7.32% (3/41) 12.20% (5/41) 100% (3/3) 20% (1/5)
Farm: Individual/
Family Trust
7.32% (3/41) 63.41% (26/41) 0% (0/3) 15.38% (4/26)
Other 2.44 (1/41) 9.76% (4/41) 0% (0/1) 50% (2/4)
Table 1 shows that farmers are not the party, generally, bringing
disputes under their contract to arbitration resolution. Table 1 also shows
that elevators and large processors are commonly the plaintiffs in arbi-
tration disputes, and farmers, mostly defendants, typically lose. In these
disputes, Figure 1 illustrates the initial allegations brought by the plaintiff,
which are: (1) failure to deliver (i.e., farmer allegedly did not deliver crops);
(2) failure to accept delivery/pick up crops (i.e., buyer did not accept deliv-
ery or pick up the crops); (3) quality standards (i.e., crops did not meet
quality standards); (4) withheld payment (i.e., buyer withholding either
complete or partial payment); and (5) other (e.g., failure to use hydromilling
technology as contracted). Failure to deliver accounts for most of the com-
plaints, followed by failure to accept the contracted crop, and failure to meet
contracted quality standards.
Figure 1
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The areas that the arguments focused on and that the final
decisions depended on are: (1) contract validity (e.g., existence of con-
tract, unsigned confirmation forms, or authority to enter into a contract);
(2) assurance of performance (i.e., whether a statement constituted
cancellation or whether a cancellation was justified); (3) due diligence (i.e.,
whether previous activity constituted performance or whether or not the
parties exercised due diligence for contract performance or validity); (4)
cancellation date (i.e., damages related; the date the contract was can-
celled and damage mitigation should have occurred); (5) cancellation cost
validity (e.g., disagreements related to the application, calculation, or va-
lidity of contract cancellation penalties); (6) passing of title (i.e., when the
crops changed title from one party to another); and (7) other (e.g., various
issues related to different obligations such as the development of new
technology). The distribution of the arguments are illustrated as follows
in Figure 2:
Figure 2
For instance, in Arbitration Case Number 2445, the defendant
alleged that because of the extreme weather during the 2007 growing
season, it did not produce sufficient quantities of wheat to meet the crop
obligations.225 The issue then became the 2008 season contracts, where
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225 W.B. Johnston Grain Co. v. Parsons, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2445 (2011)
(Mathews, Fiebiger, & Moseman, Arbs.).
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defendant informed plaintiff that no wheat would be delivered against the
contracts. Plaintiff claimed $217,975 in damages, and defendant argued
that it did not owe anything because no contract existed.226 The arbitra-
tors reasoned that based upon defendant’s business practices, a contract
for the 2008 crop had been entered into and “common sense would dictate
that [plaintiff] had nothing to gain in entering into ‘phantom’ contracts with
[defendant] given that wheat market prices could have declined . . . .”227
The arbitrators awarded $208,725 in damages to the plaintiff.228 In this
case, therefore, a dispute over quantity developed into a dispute over the
existence of the contract.
In Arbitration Case Number 2485, the defendant claimed that
market conditions made it impossible for defendant to buy the corn gluten
feed pellets under their existing contract with plaintiff.229 During the con-
tract period, defendant purchased the corn from plaintiff on a spot basis,
after alleging that the volumes purchased on this spot basis should be ap-
plied towards the required volumes existing under the parties’ long-term
contracts.230 Plaintiff argued that defendant defaulted under the contracts
and there was no reason for defendant to believe that the corn purchased
on the spot markets would be applied towards their obligations under the
long-term contracts.231 The arbitrators ruled in favor of plaintiff, holding
that defendant had no reason to believe the corn purchased would be
enough under the long-term contracts.232 The arbitrators also decided
that plaintiff failed to give proper notice about defendant being in default
as specified in the terms and conditions of the contract. Plaintiff was
awarded the sum of $61,964.233
Another common dispute revolves around a defendant not meeting
the quality standard agreed upon in the contract. For example, in Arbitra-
tion Case Number 2469, defendant delivered inferior quality cottonseed
meal pellets that did not meet heating and molding requirements in
various shipments to plaintiff.234 Plaintiff proposed a wash-out of the
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v. Garrett Enterprises, Nat’l Grain & Feed
Ass’n Arb. 2485 (2011) (Reiff, Bunz, & Karlin, Arbs.).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Network Trading Inc. v. Furst McNess Co., Nat’l Feed & Grain Ass’n Arb. 2469 (2011)
(Reiff, Bunz, & Carlin, Arbs.).
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quantities, but defendant requested an extension of the delivery period.235
Further difficulties ensued (electrical problems and a fire at the supplier’s
plant) and defendant was unable to provide the deliveries.236 Unless
plaintiff would agree to extend the contracts again, defendant argued
that it would declare force majeure on the contract and absolve it of the
unfilled obligations.237 Plaintiff refused to do so, and defendant declared
force majeure on the contract, expressing “regret for any difficulty this
actions [sic] has caused on the Buyer.”238 Plaintiff sought monetary
damages in the amount of $619,200 against defendant and was awarded
$139,568 after arbitrators calculated the differences between spot and
contract values by “marking to the market” for the relevant months of the
dispute.239
Another dispute involving quality revolved around contaminated
soybeans. In Arbitration Case Number 2533, plaintiff asked for damages,
including disposal and cleaning costs, resulting from a delivery of con-
taminated soybeans to plaintiff’s facility.240 In this case, defendant argued
that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof that it was the defendant
that had delivered the contaminated soybeans.241 Defendant also argued
that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by disposing of the entire
amount of beans rather than finding a market for the contaminated
soybeans.242 The arbitrators determined that, although the contaminated
seed was not detected by plaintiff’s initial sampling procedure, the source
of contamination came from defendant, and defendant was liable.243
Plaintiff’s “zero tolerance” policy with reference to contamination allowed
them to reasonably dispose of all the soybeans.244 Plaintiff was awarded
damages of $45,071.72.245
In Arbitration Case Number 2538 involving a dispute about the
quality of the corn shipped to plaintiff, plaintiff alleged that defendant was
in default because the corn did not arrive as specified under the terms and
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Bunge North America Inc. v. 21st Century Seed Co., Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb.
2533 (2012) (Coppin, Balvin, & Coppage, Arbs.)
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
2015] THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION 615
conditions of the contract.246 On the other hand, defendant argued that
corn was sold F.O.B. and title passed when the cars left its facility, and
that transit time to the unloading elevator was excessive and it probably
caused the deterioration of the grain.247 Additionally, defendant argued
that plaintiff did not inform defendant of the rejection in a timely manner
under the contract.248 Arbitrators ruled in favor of plaintiff and provided
an award in the amount of $48,497.71.249
3. Applying the Lessons to Biomass Contracting
As the agricultural disputes teach us, there are risks for both
parties involved in negotiating and performing under traditional agricul-
tural contracts, and one of the key risks is the risk of unenforceability of the
contract. As a result, we have agricultural contracting partners using ar-
bitration to resolve their disagreements. Parties to a contract will sign it,
signaling an interest to follow the agreed terms, but the relationship often
does not go as well as they predict. Following the breach, the opposite party
may raise different defenses to it, or even allege that the contract was not
valid from the beginning. Thereby, the argument becomes that the contract
is not enforceable against them from the beginning of the relationship.
Additionally, contracts invite expensive and lengthy litigation. Contracts
also invite arbitration disputes with awards that either do not reflect the
actual losses incurred by plaintiff, or cause great expense to defendant.
Even if arbitration might provide a less costly way to resolve contractual
disputes than the courts, arbitration disputes still take time, money, and
effort, possibly ending further exchanges between the parties.
Many of the disputes also revolve around failing to meet notification
and procedural requirements, and interpretation of the clauses in the con-
tracts. For instance, in Arbitration Case Number 2485, the defendant
failed to give proper notice about plaintiff being in default as specified in
the terms and conditions of the contract.250 In Arbitration Case Number
2538 the defendant’s argument revolved around notification and delivery
246 Lansing Trade Group LLC v. Zolman Farms Inc., Nat’l Gran & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2538
(2012) (Coppin, Balvin, & Coppage, Arbs.).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v. Garrett Enterprises, Nat’l Grain & Feed
Ass’n Arb. 2485 (2011) (Reiff, Bunz, & Karlin, Arbs.).
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clauses in the contract.251 The interpretation of clauses in the contract is
another issue for arbitration. In Arbitration Case Number 2401, one of the
questions to be decided was whether the “Act of God” provision’s exception
would excuse the failure to deliver under the contract in case of flooding.252
In this case, the buyer was excused from performance under the contract,
but not the seller (defendant).253 Moreover, while the defendant argued
that the plaintiff’s field marketers may have said that “flooding” should be
covered under the contract as an “Act of God,” the contract included an item
that excused plaintiff from opinions expressed by its field marketers.254
In this case, the contract provided many rights to the plaintiff, but not the
defendant.255 Since the defendant signed the terms of the contract, the
arbitrators ruled in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $199,800.256
In deciding agricultural contract disputes, arbitrators often make
references to “normal trade practice and protocol”257 and “trade rules and
practices.”258 At this point in time, common “trade practices” for dedicated
energy crops are still being developed. Hence, we may eventually find that
biomass contracting involves the same trade practice as traditional crops,
but it may be the case that different trade practices are formed given the
particularities of the bioenergy industry. Therefore, while the trade rules
and practices in agricultural disputes in arbitration may guide parties
when the case involves traditional crops, it is not clear yet whether the
same practices will also be applied to dedicated energy crops.
The bioenergy industry may benefit from the lessons from common
disputes in agricultural contracts because end-users of biomass will most
251 Lansing Trade Group LLC, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2538.
252 Cargill Inc. v. F.L. Wilson Inc., Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2401 (2010) (Brocklesby,
Cropp, & Jones, Arbs.).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See id. (a similar argument was raised by defendant that non-delivery was exempt by
an “Act of God” clause in the event of a natural disaster. The arbitrators found again that
the signed contract did not provide for an “Act of God” in favor of defendant).
257 See id. (noting defendant does not have a claim to require that plaintiff receive a
written confirmation from defendant because this is not normal trade and practice).
258 See Cargill Inc. v. Truckor, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2328 (2011) (Krueger,
Anderson, Elsea, Milbank & Young, Arbs.) (noting that defendant failed to follow trade
rules and practices when it did not object to the notices from plaintiff with which he claimed
to have been in disagreement); Markit County Grain LLC v. Anderson, Nat’l Grain & Feed
Ass’n Arb. 2344 (2010) (Sutherland, Brammer, Potter, Arbs.) (arbitrators denied defen-
dant argument that no contract was formed based on the fact that defendant’s course of
conduct would be inconsistent with trade practice).
2015] THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION 617
likely encounter similar enforceability problems when contracting with
biomass producers. For instance, we saw that failure to deliver is the most
common dispute between parties, and it makes up more than seventy per-
cent of all disputes between buyers and sellers.259 However, we also saw in
Figure 2 that counterarguments will not be limited to delivery issues, but
parties may raise all kinds of arguments, ranging from failure to meet
quality standards and changes in market conditions, to the validity of the
contract to begin with.260 Failure to meet quality standards is also a com-
mon source of dispute. The issue becomes that, if there are quality prob-
lems with traditional crops and a market and techniques that are very well
known by both parties, dedicated energy crops may face even more prob-
lems. Hence, in a situation involving dedicated energy crops with higher
levels of asset specificity than soybeans or corn, failure to deliver or fail-
ure to meet quality requirements will be more likely to occur. Disputes
involving failure to deliver and to meet quality standards will also have
more negative effects on parties to biomass transactions, especially the
buyer of the biomass feedstock. The quality specifications make the feed-
stock contracted for with the breaching party a unique product. If the
seller fails to deliver, the buyer cannot easily go to the market to purchase
the exact same product. Similarly, if the buyer holds up and does not pur-
chase the biomass hoping to appropriate a share of the production surplus,
the seller cannot easily go to the market to sell that biomass because that
biomass feedstock has little or no value outside the relationship with the
original buyer.
In summary, our study of agricultural disputes reveals that basic
disputes arise under contracts in well-established markets like those for
commodity corn and soybeans. Failure to deliver and failure to accept ag-
ricultural products are the most common complaints in the arbitration
cases examined. After the breach, parties seek arbitration to request dam-
ages for the losses incurred under the contract, such as damages for re-
placing the product elsewhere261 and disposing of the low-quality crop.262
It is interesting to note that large elevators are generally plaintiffs under
259 See supra Fig. 1.
260 See supra Fig. 2.
261 See Cargill Inc. v. Philen Farm P’ship, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Arb. 2361 (2012)
(Schwinke, Breedlove, & Katovich, Arbs.) (plaintiff argued a loss of $57,300 as the result
of defendant’s alleged breach of the contract and the significant increase in market prices
that occurred thereafter); US Commodities LLC v. Kottschade, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n
Arb. 2341 (2009) (Burke, Prickett, & Williams, Arbs.) (Plaintiff sought to collect damages
representing differences in market prices which totaled $155,096.11).
262 See Bunge North America Inc. v. 21st Century Seed Inc., Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n
Arb. 2533 (2012) (Coppin, Balvin, & Coppage, Arbs.).
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the arbitration cases, and they win some kind of award more than eighty
percent of the time.263 Farmers, on the other hand, are generally defen-
dants in these cases. If we had a vertically integrated model in this indus-
try, these agricultural disputes would have been eliminated, because large
elevators and processors would grow their own corn and wheat. However,
for traditional commodity crops, the costs involved in internalizing this
process are higher than purchasing the products on the open market from
independent parties.
The issue is that there is a probability that these same agricultural
disputes will replicate in biomass transactions. Given the higher concern
with quality and reliable supply, and in light of the unique characteristics
of the bioenergy industry, these disputes are likely to be even more fre-
quent. Whether arbitrators will borrow the “normal trade practices and
protocols” of traditional agricultural crops and apply them to biomass con-
tracts is still to be decided. The model contracts analyzed below reflect
some of the tensions in biomass contracting that anticipate the occurrence
of common disputes in traditional agricultural contracts.
B. Analysis of Model Biomass Contracts
For our analysis of model biomass contracts, we collected publicly
available contracts and contacted private companies involved in biomass
production and procurement. We analyzed the real-life contracts that we
were able to obtain and divided them into three groups according to their
characteristics. These model contracts represent what is currently found
in the bioenergy industry. We present an analysis of the main character-
istics of these contracts and our conclusions about what would be the issues
parties should consider in choosing the optimal organizational structure
for a biomass supply chain. The following sections break down and sum-
marize the relevant terms in the contracts. More details concerning each
contact can be found in the Appendices to this Article.
1. Initial Considerations
The developing bioenergy industry requires a reliable supply of
biomass, and the reliability of supply can be influenced by biomass pur-
chase contracts and by logistical planning.264 When the theory of transac-
tion cost economics is applied to the bioenergy industry, it suggests that
because of the presence of asset specificity, the industry should likely be
more vertically integrated. This is because, as noted above, transaction
263 See supra Table 1.
264 Williams, supra note 47.
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cost economics articulates that when contracting costs exceed external
procurement costs (i.e., costs of contracting), parties are more likely to ver-
tically integrate.265 As we will see, biomass contracts tend to employ pro-
visions to address the varying degrees of asset specificity present in the
transactions they govern. In other words, the asset specificity related char-
acteristics of the biomass crop and end uses involved in the transaction
inform the contractual provisions employed. The analysis of model con-
tracts will highlight the current organizational structures in the bioenergy
industry, and expose specific issues and concerns of the contracting par-
ties. When we also compare the most common agricultural disputes with
the common provisions of model biomass contracts, we can better antici-
pate the risks parties may encounter, and prescribe the best measures to
avoid contractual disputes.
As mentioned above, vertical integration reduces the incentives for
parties to hold-up and to act opportunistically because the supply chain
and the objectives of the different stages of the production processes will
be aligned. Vertical integration also solves the problem of specific in-
vestments, and helps to address asset specificity concerns. In the bioenergy
industry, the relevant assets and investments generally include the pro-
cessing facility, the biomass cultivation and harvesting equipment, stor-
age and transportation equipment, as well as the time and managing effort
of the producer. According to Altman et al., the types of asset specificity
that are likely to be significant in the bioenergy industry include: (1) phys-
ical asset specificity and spatial asset specificity of the processing facility;
(2) physical asset specificity of biomass production; (3) specific transpor-
tation and storage assets; and (4) human asset specificity associated with
biomass managing efforts.266 The analysis of the language in the model
contracts described below confirms that parties acknowledge the existence
of asset specificity and logistic challenges in the contract. As discussed
above, contract incompleteness and enforcement costs create obstacles for
parties to behave efficiently. We argue that problems during the perfor-
mance of the contract, together with potential agricultural disputes that
may risk the development of the industry, advocate, at least initially, for
higher presence of more vertically integrated organizational structures.
2. The Biomass Exchange Platform
The Biomass Exchange Contract in Appendix A is very basic but is
a good point at which to start because this contract sets forth the most
265 See The Economics of Organization, supra note 87, at 558.
266 Contracting for Biomass, supra note 29, at 5.
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basic provisions in a biomass contract. The Biomass Exchange Contract
is a general template to be used by a supplier and buyer of biomass to reg-
ulate the sale of biomass using the electronic services of the Minneapolis
Biomass Exchange (“MBE”) platform. A biomass exchange is a mechanism
that aims to strengthen the biomass value chain by, among other services,
assuring an available market for the resource providers or the producers
and consistent feedstock availability, promoting the exchange of informa-
tion between parties, and assuring the resource quality.267
The Biomass Exchange Contract is a suggested basic agreement
offered by the MBE. The MBE is a biomass exchange that functions as a
listing and bidding platform to biomass buyers and sellers, where they can
connect to each other, and others in the industry, furthering biomass trade,
and industry knowledge and growth.268 A buyer in need of biomass feed-
stock would approach the biomass exchange, where it would be appraised
of the availability of the requested feedstock provided by sellers, as well
as the quantity and quality of the feedstock. The MBE also offers online
settlement, quality control services, and market information in order to
reduce the risk in this market and increase trade opportunities. Similar
to the Biomass Exchange Contract, the MBE offers spot contracts on an
“as-needed basis.” The type of feedstock contracted for is not specified in
this template, but it can be arranged for by the MBE. One of the roles of a
biomass exchange platforms is to facilitate the trading of different types
of biomass, such as corn stover, dedicated energy grasses, wood chips, etc.269
The term of the contract is not specified because it is a spot-type
contract template. The contract contemplates that the supplier is one who
regularly engages in the business of “planting, growing, maintaining, har-
vesting, handling and/or selling one or more types of biomass.”270 Quantity
to be delivered and type of biomass are not specified. In terms of delivery,
the contract provides that the buyer is the one scheduling delivery dates
and quantities to be delivered by written or electronic notice. The sup-
plier is responsible for the costs associated with delivery of the biomass.
The price clause is not extensive or complex and it only provides that the
267 Setu Goyal, Biomass Exchange—Key to Success in Biomass Projects, BIOENERGY CONSULT
(May 7, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.bioenergyconsult.com/biomass-exchange/, archived
at http://perma.cc/P83T-HHPN.
268 Mission Statement, MBIOEX, https://www.mbioex.com/mission, archived at https://perma
.cc/EHY9-BVN4 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
269 Listing: For Sale, MBIOEX, https://www.mbioex.com/listings, archived at https://perma
.cc/7KAL-CYBZ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (listing the different crops for sale in the
Biomass Exchange).
270 See infra app. A.
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supplier will quote prices on the MBE. In this case, it appears that parties
have the option to delegate the calculation of the price of biomass to the
MBE, and do not need to address it fully in the contract. The MBE offers
USDA price reports to be used as estimates by the parties. Payments are
not made in advance, but the buyer has the option to make a deposit to se-
cure delivery by the supplier.
The quality of biomass is defined as the “type described on the
[MBE], fit for Buyer’s needs.”271 Again, if there is a need for more sophisti-
cated agreement, buyers and sellers may use other agreements and ser-
vices offered by the MBE. The warranty clause provides that the supplier
will correct any warranty breach at its expense, pay direct damages, and
defend the buyer from any resulting claims. The Biomass Exchange Con-
tract provides for potential remedies for failure to make conforming de-
liveries, where the buyer has five business days to inspect and reject any
non-conforming biomass. The buyer has the burden of proving that bio-
mass is non-conforming and rejected biomass may be returned at the sup-
plier’s expense. The contract also reserves the right to the buyer to refuse
any biomass, and to cancel the contract if the supplier fails to deliver all
or any part of biomass in accordance with the contract.
The contract does not specify whether the buyer has the right to
suspend delivery until the seller resolves quality problems. The lack of
remedies in the case of non-conforming biomass reveals contract gaps and
it also places the seller in a weaker position because, while the seller
may not have another chance to redeliver conforming biomass, the con-
tract gives the buyer the right to cancel the entire contract after one non-
conforming delivery. According to the remedies provided to the buyer (right
to reject biomass and cancel all or part of the contract), the seller does not
appear to have the ability to remediate the non-conforming biomass deliv-
ery at its own expense. If so, the seller will have the burden of finding an-
other buyer for its biomass. Where investments are made to conform the
biomass to the needs of a specific buyer, and the ability to terminate the
agreement raises significant concerns for sellers, their weak position may
prevent them from entering the biomass industry. Finally, the contract
provides for arbitration in case of controversies arising out of the contract.
In the absence of vertical integration, participants in the bioenergy
industry need to assure commitment by all parties involved to generate
sufficient biomass, and to encourage investment in the industry.272 This
271 See infra app. A.
272 See ZWART & DE BOER, ROTTERDAM CLIMATE INITIATIVE, MARKET ANALYSIS FOR THE
START OF A BIOMASS COMMODITIES EXCHANGE (2010), available at http://biomassconsultancy
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is the role biomass exchange platforms such as the MBE seek to perform.
Their objective is to meet the demand of market parties for reliable trading
instruments by encouraging information exchange and cooperation in a
more consistent biomass marketplace.273 However, while biomass ex-
changes are an option for providing assurances in this growing market,
they do so at certain costs, such as the cost of maintaining and administer-
ing the platform. Moreover, a spot-contract may be an efficient alternative
where goods are easily fungible, which is not a reality yet in the present
biomass industry. Building the trust and commitment in this market is
essential to boost its growth. For instance, farmers have shown unwill-
ingness to harvest biomass that has nutrient value to the field unless
there is a guaranteed seller for the biomass.274 The biomass exchange
purports to solve this problem by allowing farmers to offer their product
prior to harvesting.275 In such cases, farmers are therefore offering the
product before incurring any harvesting costs, but do not guarantee quan-
tity or quality for end-users. It is questionable whether a market that re-
quires high initial investment will develop around this somewhat fragile
commitment structure.
3. The Aggregator’s Role
A biomass feedstock aggregator combines a large number of biomass
sources so that they may provide a supply of feedstock that is large enough
to warrant marketing.276 An aggregator generally works to balance the ma-
terials available, the logistics of the market, as well as provide sufficient
quantities to customers as needed, and in some cases perform some process-
ing of the biomass feedstock for end-users.277 The purpose of aggregators
.com/Publications/Market%20Analysis%20Biomass%20Commodities%20Exchange%20
August%202010.pdf (noting that farmers were reluctant to harvesting agricultural residues
unless a credible market was already in place).
273 Id. at 6–7.
274 Id. at 35.
275 See Madhu Khanna, Policy Incentives for Energy Crop Production: Role of the Biomass
Crop Assistance Program, POLICY MATTERS (June 3, 2014), http://policymatters.illinois
.edu/policy-incentives-for-energy-crop-production-role-of-the-biomass-crop-assistance-
program/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6VV-JQR8.
276 See Wisconsin’s Biomass Edge, FARM PROGRESS (Jan. 2012), available at http://mag
issues.farmprogress.com/WSA/WA01Jan12/wsa048.pdf (suggesting an aggregator markets
a crop); see also UNIV. OF MO., MISSOURI BIOMASS AGGREGATOR BUSINESS PLAN (2011),
available at http://crops.missouri.edu/corn/BiomassAggregatorBusinessPlan.pdf.
277 Pradeep J. Tharakan et al., Evaluating the Impact of Three Incentive Programs on the
Economics of Cofiring Willow Biomass with Coal in New York State, 33 ENERGY POL’Y
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in the biomass supply chain is to reduce transaction costs and risks related
to the supply and demand of biomass. While “corn is corn,” biomass is
often a seasonal mixture of different waste products. An aggregator may
make an offer to a farmer on corn stover that a farmer might need to bal-
ance out with a supply of switchgrass, or some other feedstock that does
not quite meet the quality required by some biorefineries. Since biomass
is a mixture whereas corn, beans, and wheat are homogeneous, one of the
jobs of an aggregator appears to be to seek out the right raw materials to
yield a marketable mixture in sufficient quantities.
The following contracts involve producers of biomass feedstock
(such as farmers), biomass aggregators (including, but not limited to a co-
operative) and end-users (such as a power plant, cellulosic ethanol plant,
industrial user, or other biomass conversion facility). As discussed below,
the aggregator enters into contracts with producers in order to sell the
biomass feedstock to end-users (in this case the aggregator will also per-
form some processing of the feedstock). Each party has specific issues to
be addressed in the contract. For producers of biomass, the main issues are
the investments required and the risks of producing the biomass.278 As
discussed in Section III, crop establishment issues and the cost of key in-
puts to produce the biomass are key concerns to farmers. Furthermore, the
duration of the contract and risk allocations should be designed in a way
that justifies initial investments.279 End-users need reliable supply and
price certainty. End-users also need the feedstock to meet specific quality
standards. Aggregators, serving as an intermediary between the two, pur-
port to receive the quantity and quality contracted with producers to meet
end-user specifications, thereby entering into complex agreements and
incurring the costs of storage, transportation, and non-conforming delivery.
The key issue for aggregators is to maintain a profitable transaction be-
tween the cost of feedstock purchased from producers, and the sale of the
processed biomass.280
Aggregator Contracts I and II offer a template with the key issues
that parties should address and customize to their specific needs. Aggre-
gator Contract I is an example of a model contract between a producer
of biomass feedstock and an aggregator of the feedstock. The essential
337, 339 (2005); see Model Biomass Agreement: Presentation to Biomass Market Development
Initiative Meeting, ENERGYLAW (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://www.stateenergyoffice
.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=20582&locid=160 (discussing the role of aggregators).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
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clauses discussed here are detailed in Appendix B. Aggregator Contract I
does not involve the use of a biomass exchange to mediate or complete
the terms of the transaction. The type of feedstock contracted for is not
described, but footnote 1 of Aggregator Contract I specifies that it con-
templates “unprocessed or minimally processed biomass.” This footnote
also notes that this contract can be adapted for contracts involving lim-
ited processing biomass and it suggests a separate “Biomass Procure-
ment Agreement” to address size, density or content issues that arise in
the relationship between an aggregator and the purchaser of the pro-
cessed biomass.
Aggregator Contract I highlights the essential terms of a biomass
production agreement, and similarly to what the literature on biomass con-
tracting prescribes, quality, minimum quantity, deliveries, compensation,
and costs are generally provided for. Exhibit A of the contract describes the
type of renewable biomass raw materials and the specific source locations
required under the contract by the purchaser. Exhibit A also provides the
template for the specific type of biomass to be inserted, and what specifi-
cations the biomass must conform to, including weight, moisture, and ac-
ceptable amount of foreign material. This contract notes that parties may
add additional criteria that might be critical to the biomass buyer, such as
dimensions, content, chemical, and mineral constituents, etc.
Exhibit B of Aggregator Contract I presents basic provisions on
compensation. Footnote 16 indicates that if parties have agreed that the
purchaser will be only paid on a fixed price basis with few or no adjust-
ments, Exhibit B is not part of the contract. Adjustments may include com-
pensation for additional services if they are not included in the cost of the
biomass. In this case, the purchaser should compensate the seller for ser-
vices such as transportation, storage, and delivery services. That is because
footnote 17 in Exhibit B notes that:
[T]he basis for compensation for transportation is critical
and affects other aspects of performance. For example, if
payment is based on units of biomass measured by weight
times the distance transported, then moisture content is
critical, as it would increase the transport cost, but reduce
the combustion value of the biomass.281
Another concern in Exhibit B revolves around increases in the cost of
critical inputs, such as insurance, property taxes, seed, diesel fuel, and
281 Infra app. B at Exhibit B.
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storage. The contract observes that these costs are a significant concern
for producers, even discouraging some potential biomass producers from
getting into the industry. Additional services also include compensating
seller for crop establishment assistance, but footnote 18 notes that it may
raise complex issues such as how it interacts with Biomass Crop Assis-
tance Program payments. Exhibit C provides a list of definitions to avoid
any ambiguity in regards to the definition of a specific word in the contract.
Exhibit D specifies that the Aggregator and the farmer “agree to
cooperate fully with each other in the provision of the services [under the
contract].”282 This clause suggests the importance of logistics and aligning
the relationship in a way that goes beyond a market trade; cooperation, for
the reasons discussed above, influences the performance in biomass con-
tracts because a cooperative arrangement alleviates the effect of asset
specificity. Nevertheless, they agree that the farmer is an independent con-
tractor and has the freedom to determine the means and method of deliv-
ering the biomass and performing the related services. The farmer will
not be considered an agent, servant or employee of the Aggregator. This
clause appears to address employment and agency concerns, but even if
parties are supposed to act independently, the contract provides for exten-
sive and detailed specifications to govern their relationship.
In terms of indemnity, footnotes on Exhibit D note that parties to
the contract should tailor what types of damages and the extent to which
risks should be covered in the contract. For instance, the contract may spec-
ify how to deal with the situation where non-conforming biomass damages
the biorefinery’s equipment. Whether parties in biomass contracts should
or should not be indemnified for this kind of risk depends not only on the
traditional provisions in agricultural contracts, but whether the contract
may be more tailored to the particular characteristics of the nascent bio-
mass industry. The template suggests that the farmer incurs the cost of
providing insurance (general liability insurance, workers compensation
insurance, and any other to be agreed between the parties). The template
also suggests negotiation, followed by arbitration, to resolve disputes aris-
ing under the agreement.
Aggregator Contract II in Appendix C is designed to be used
between an Aggregator and an end-user of the biomass feedstock. Some
of the provisions in Aggregator Contract II are similar to Aggregator Con-
tract I, but, differently, since here we have a contract between an aggrega-
tor and the end-user, the concern is also to provide value-added processing
282 Infra app. B at Exhibit D.
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to the biomass, such as densification, pelletizing or chipping to address
concerns about density, content, or size.
Because in this case the aggregator will process the biomass,
footnote 3 suggests that parties specify not only the type of process, but
also the specific equipment that will be using the biomass so that parties
may cooperate on achieving emission controls and preserving the func-
tion of the equipment. Exhibit A of Aggregator Contract II provides some
of the issues that must be addressed by the parties, such as the testing
and delivery specifications, moisture, weight, biomass particle size if appli-
cable, managing mineral content (such as silica which can corrode equip-
ment) and foreign material, etc. It also provides for “Specifications for
Laboratory Testing” where parties need to include how often tests will
occur, who does the testing and how costs shall be allocated. Exhibit B ad-
dresses compensation provisions, and just like in Aggregator Contract I,
it highlights that the basis for compensation for transportation is critical
and affects other aspects of the contract performance. One of the clauses
in Exhibit B concerns crop establishment assistance, and it also notes
that crop establishment provisions raise complex issues (such as to what
extent such assistance should be reduced by crop establishment incentive
programs). Another provision suggests payment of the biomass on a “take
or pay” basis, where end-user would either take the biomass from the
aggregator or pay the aggregator a penalty. Such arrangement certainly
includes risks to the end-user, and parties would want to consider whether
the buyer is excused under certain circumstances.
Exhibit D contains general conditions, and similarly to Aggregator
Contract I, parties establish that the end-user is engaging aggregator as
an independent contractor and aggregator determines the means and
method of delivering the biomass and performing the related services.
Again, despite this provision, Aggregator Contract II extensively provides
for quality, transportation, processing, compensation and other specifica-
tions. The template suggests that the Aggregator incurs the cost of pro-
viding insurance to end-users in the processed biomass (general liability
insurance, workers compensation insurance, and any other to be agreed
between the parties). The template also suggests negotiation, followed by
binding arbitration, to resolve disputes arising under the agreement.
As noted above, biomass aggregators purport to organize the
contracting, logistics, storage, and mixing of biomass feedstock streams
to meet end-users needs. The presence of aggregators in the market tend
to indicate that the industry developed to a stage where the material is
fungible enough that it can be “aggregated” and sold by an intermediary
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to end-users. However, the aggregator’s goals might be jeopardized by a
current infant biomass industry that does not have established supply or
demand sides.283 In other words, the risk of an insufficient quality and
quantity supply of biomass feedstock was merely shifted from end-users
to aggregators, and the possibility of breaches of contract still presents a
high risk.
4. The Cooperatives’ Role in Biomass Contracting
a. The Cooperative Model
Another aspect of the current biomass supply chain is the existence
of industry participants acting as intermediaries between farmers and
biofuel plants and end-users. The farm cooperative business model for bio-
energy has been identified as an option for the organizational structure
of the biomass industry.284 In transactional cost theory, the rationale be-
hind the cooperative model largely overlaps the theory positing vertical
integration.285 Just as in the vertical integration model, the cooperative
model is based “on the members’ efforts to integrate either forwards or
backwards in the processing/distribution chain, albeit jointly because
each one is too small to accomplish the task separately.”286 Cooperatives
play an important economic role for independent farms in providing more
competitive returns and access to difficult or more complex and expensive
markets.287 Cooperatives are established in response to the presence of
high transaction costs that arise among independent trading partners,
and that make market contracting expensive if parties contract alone.
When members join forces in a cooperative structure, they are more able
to counteract market failures, such as the hold-up and transaction-specific
problems discussed above.288
Cooperatives also allow members to pool resources and take
advantage of economies of scale.289 For instance, in the case of storage and
283 See Missouri Biomass Aggregator Business, supra note 276, at 8 (discussing the
weakness of the aggregator’s role).
284 Downing et al., supra note 65, at 432–33.
285 Jerker Nilsson, Organisational Principles for Co-operative Firms, 17 SCAND. J. MGMT.
329, 332 (2001).
286 Id.
287 Id. at 332–33.
288 See id. at 332 (noting that when farmers own the trading partner in a cooperative
model, “transaction costs can be reduced, and due to the difference in the optimal scale
of operations.”).
289 Id.
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transportation of biomass feedstock, members of a cooperative may take
advantage of common infrastructure. Cooperative members can use ma-
chinery and buy inputs such as seeds and fertilizer at a better price than
a member would get if buying them on their own. Additionally, cooperatives
allow farmers to focus on farming, and the managers of the cooperative to
focus on managing the logistics, such as finding a market for seeds, finding
transportation, etc.290 Farmers pay a price, generally small, to become a
member of a cooperative, but that price buys them more distance from
the hassle they would have in contracting and managing the crop on
their own.291
Some studies argue that the cooperative form presents many
inefficiencies.292 First, it is said that because members in a cooperative do
not control management, cooperatives may suffer from the principal-agent
problem and incur high control costs.293 The agency theory is concerned
with the relationship between principal and its agents, more specifically
with problems associated with the separation of ownership and control
when principals and agents differ in their objectives.294 In an agricultural
cooperative setting, property rights are generally vaguely defined, and
members have no individual ownership right to the cooperative decisions
concerning the individually owned shares made by the society, as well as
capital that is also subject to collective decision making.295 Therefore, the
argument is that this allocation of property rights does not provide incen-
tives for members to invest in the further development of the cooperative
business.296 Additionally, managers in a cooperative generally enjoy con-
siderable power and stability, since the management is not often replaced
and it is difficult for members to evaluate managers.297 This structure
leads to the situation where there is no external information available to
the principal (member) that can be used to evaluate the performance of the
agents (managers), thus providing little incentive for principals to monitor
290 John King, Farmers Say Co-ops Work for Feed, Seed and Health Care, CNN POLITICS
(Sept. 4, 2009, 10:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/04/sotu.wisconsin.coop/,
archived at http://perma.cc/UBH3-JCLH.
291 Id.
292 Nilsson, supra note 243, at 285 (inefficiencies are based on unclear property rights and
high agency costs).
293 Id. at 333.
294 Id. at 333–34.
295 Id. at 332.
296 Id. at 338.
297 Id. at 339.
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the managers of the cooperative, to compel the director to operate in their
interest, and to innovate the way the cooperative conducts its business.298
Second, because members cannot put a price on their collective
ownership in the cooperative, there is a short-term characteristic of the
member’s investment and there is a presence of the so called “horizon
problem.”299 It has been noted that:
Since the employees have claims on cash flows that are con-
tingent on employment, their expected employment period
will enter investment decisions. An employee, in evaluating
an investment decision, will truncate cash flows excluding
periods in which the assets are productive but which are
beyond his expected employment termination date. Thus,
a project, to be accepted, will require the present value of
the truncated cash flows to exceed outlays. Some projects
with positive net present value will be rejected reducing
demand for capital.300
Put differently, since members in a cooperative cannot capture future
payoffs of such investments, members will influence the decisions of the
collective based on the horizon problem, where under-investment is ex-
pected.301 Hence, even if planning horizons may differ among members
and between members and management, these differences will lead to
greater restraint of long-term investments that yield the development of
the business. Since members are concerned with the benefits of their
membership while they are still members, potentially good and sustain-
able investments may not be pursued, and the value of the cooperative
is reduced.302 Economies of scale are also affected by the property structure
and the short-term horizon for investments from its members.303 In addi-
tion, if cooperatives do not charge an entrance fee, new entrants will enjoy
the prior investments made by former members, therefore being allowed
298 Philip K. Porter & Gerald W. Scully, Economic Efficiency in Cooperatives, 30 J.L. & ECON.
489, 495 (1987) (noting that the inability to define ownership leads to underinvestment
and reduces the incentives of its members to innovate).
299 R. Srinivasan & S.J. Phansalkar, Residual Claims in Co-Operatives: Design Issues, 74
ANNALS OF PUB. & COOP. ECON. 365, 368 (2003).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 See id. (explaining that because of the horizon problem, some projects with positive net
present value to the company will be rejected by the cooperative members).
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to become free riders.304 Therefore, the potential to free ride, together with
the short-horizon problem, reduces members’ involvement and incentives
to invest further in the development of the cooperative.
Despite such disadvantages, the cooperative form is commonly
employed by different businesses, and public policy in many countries sup-
ports the existence of cooperatives.305 In fact, in the context of agricultural
exchanges and the nascent bioenergy industry organization, the coopera-
tive framework may allow a better balance and more certainty in the mar-
ket for both farmers and biomass end-users than spot markets or contracts
that do not address important terms or are simply too incomplete. Downing
et al. assess the development and performance of agricultural coopera-
tives and establish the conditions under which a farm cooperative business
structure would be adequate for the bioenergy market.306 It was found that
biomass purchasers generally face less risks and transaction costs when
contracting with a single cooperative, rather than with independent and
dispersed farmers.307 Some of the advantages of cooperatives in this mar-
ket are that the cooperative may provide more certainty and stable supply
and delivery of the crop than if the same transaction was done only by con-
tracts with individual farmers.308 Therefore, biomass purchasers may pre-
fer to contract with cooperatives rather than with farmers in an effort to
increase the likelihood of certain deliveries over longer periods of time.
For the cooperative members, one of the benefits is that farmers
could have support in harvesting, transporting, and storage of the biomass.
Members also receive the benefit of the cooperative in the form of organi-
zation, support, improved services, and terms of trade.309 In addition, there
is strength that arises from community education and involvement. The
question becomes whether the biomass industry, more specifically the rela-
tionship between farmers and purchasers of biomass, would benefit from
the existence of a cooperative form. Thus, whether the business conditions
inherent to biomass justify the existence of cooperatives will largely depend
on the degree of asset specificity in the industry. Higher levels of asset spec-
ificity for the biomass buyer represent higher quality and delivery risks.
For the farmers, there are more costs involved in planting, managing, and
304 Nilsson, supra note 285, at 336–37.
305 Porter & Scully, supra note 298, at 491 (noting that the inability to define ownership
leads to underinvestment and reduces the incentives of its members to innovate).
306 Downing et al., supra note 65, at 432–33.
307 Id. at 431.
308 Id.
309 Nilsson, supra note 285, at 336.
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delivering the crop. For both parties, opportunism and hold-up problems
still persist in a contractual arrangement. An analysis of the contracts
between the cooperative and the individual farmer, and the cooperative and
the biomass purchaser addresses some of the concerns described above.
b. Contracting with the Cooperative
Cooperative Contract I in Appendix D is a ten-year contract to be
entered into between an Environmental Fuels Cooperative and Land
Owner/Grower member. The type of feedstock contracted for is vegetative
waste and woody materials that comply with specifications under the
contract. The cooperative has been formed by a number of agriculture and
farming interests consisting of individuals and/or corporations. As part of
the business services performed on behalf of its members, the cooperative
may enter into a Fuel Supply Agreement of biomass fuel with the electric
department of a city. Hence, Cooperative Contract I governs the general
relationship between the cooperative and its members, where the cooper-
ative will later enter in a Fuel Supply Agreement with city on behalf of its
members for sale of biomass.
Section 2 of Cooperative Contract I defines “biomass fuel” as plant
material, including trunks, stems, leaves, and twigs harvested for fuel feed-
stock to produce electricity, not having a dual commercial use. According
to the Purpose and Intent section, “[the member] represents that prudent
and reasonable levels of due diligence have been performed as to [the] def-
inition of biomass fuel.”310 This provision, together with the “Definition
of Biomass Fuel,” states the objectives of the relationship and it is an op-
portunity for parties to set the tone and establish parameters that will
inform the interpretation and application of the provisions in the contract.
As already seen in the contracts above, here the ability of farmers to meet
the minimum amount requirements, with the quality of feedstock as spec-
ified under the contract, is also a major concern of the cooperative.
Cooperative Contract I also provides that the quality of the bio-
mass fuel will be specified in the Fuel Supply Agreement, and continued
non-compliance of fuel quality will be a material event that may lead to ter-
mination of the Fuel Supply Agreement. The contract states that the defini-
tion of biomass fuel is a material provision of the Fuel Supply Agreement,
and a condition of default under the contract. The contract goes on to spec-
ify that in the event members are unable to fulfill the defined minimum
310 Infra app. D.
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annual volume deliveries, members will reimburse the cooperative based
on a formula that takes into account funds advanced to them, and the def-
icit of actual annual volume deliveries offered to the cooperative. Mem-
bers are responsible for acquiring and keeping in force crop insurance,
and failure to comply with the insurance requirement may also lead to
the termination of the Fuel Supply Agreement. In terms of financing, the
contract specifies that the cooperative, acting on behalf and for the ben-
efit of members, shall incur costs in obtaining the finance for the crop
establishment costs.
Finally, under Cooperative Contract I, as a condition for the
execution of the contract, members are required to submit a “Plantation
Site Plan” for review and approval by the cooperative. Among other things,
the Plantation Site Plan includes a description of plantation site, manage-
ment plan, and planting schedule for trees. The cooperative will then sub-
mit a report of crop establishment costs based on the Plantation Site Plan
and the approved report will provide the basis for the city to finance 50%
of the establishment and maintenance costs of the plantation. As men-
tioned above, organization, support, and education in the area are some of
the services a cooperative provide to its members in order to maximize
their benefits inside the cooperative.
While members appear to assume many of the obligations under
the contract with the cooperative, such as to reimburse the cooperative in
case the minimum annual delivery is not reached, members also gain from
jointly running the agricultural enterprise, and sharing profits and ben-
efits. In the bioenergy industry context, individual farmers that make spe-
cific investments in machinery, land, personnel, etc. are vulnerable on the
market. The costs of entering the business alone, and adapting or provid-
ing under specific quality, quantity, and location requirements may be
higher for the individual farmer than the expected profits. For a buyer of
biomass (e.g., the city in Cooperative Contract I), uncertainties in agricul-
tural production and dependence on the biomass to be supplied present
a constant risk to his business. Therefore, both parties incur high trans-
action costs from trading independently. When members of a cooperative,
jointly enter into a contract with the trade partner, transaction costs and
hold-up problems on both sides are reduced, while the availability of financ-
ing and cooperation mechanisms increase, especially on the farmer’s side.
Similarly to Cooperative Contract I, which is to be entered into by
the cooperative and its members, Cooperative Contract II in Appendix E
governs the relationship between a cooperative that sells the biomass
fuel (plant material including trunks, stems, leaves, and twigs) and buyer
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for production of biofuel. The type of feedstock contracted for is plant
material including trunks, stems, leaves, and twigs. Cooperative Contract
II shows that even when there is a buyer of feedstock on one side, and a
cooperative on the other side, concerns about minimum quantity, delivery,
quality, and logistics persist. This is because the biomass still presents
high levels of asset specificity. The existence of a farmer-owned cooperative
may provide better assistance and support for its members to perform
under the contract with buyer, but uncertainty still permeates the rela-
tionship between seller and buyer.
Cooperative Contract II was entered between a municipal corpora-
tion, the buyer, and a fuel cooperative, the seller, for the duration of twelve
years. The feedstock contracted for is plant material, including trunks,
stems, leaves, twigs, harvested for fuel-feed stock and not having a duel
commercial use. The cooperative is defined as a “competent supplier of bio-
mass fuel, owning and controlling or having exclusive right to offer fuel
for sale sufficient to partially meet the requirements of the Buyer.”311 The
initial provisions in the contract establish that the corporation requires
a “dependable and high quality biomass fuel source with the experience
and capability necessary to supply.”312
Section 1 goes on to state that the cooperative’s performance under
the contract is essential to the corporation’s ability to meet environmental
initiatives and renewable energy marketing objectives. Section 1 also spec-
ifies that the corporation relies upon the cooperative’s ability to furnish
the portion of the fuel supply it needs. This statement in Section 1 is a ma-
terial provision of this contract. The initial provisions serve the purpose
of describing the general approach parties have to the relationship. Par-
ties to the contract have an opportunity to set the tone for their contractual
relationship, and such tone will inform the interpretation of the entire con-
tract. Here, the corporation expresses concern about the ability of the
cooperative to timely supply the high quality biomass source, and this con-
cern is reflected in the beginning of the contract. Consequently, minimum
annual quantities are required, and the time requirements contained in the
schedule are of the essence in the contract. Failure to deliver by the cooper-
ative in violation of the delivery schedule is a material default under the
contract. Parties also provide for rejection, and the corporation may choose
to accommodate the cooperative’s occasional production variables.
The expected quality of the biomass fuel is described in detail, and
sampling and analysis are also specified in the contract. For instance,
311 Infra app. E.
312 Infra app. E.
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conforming biomass will comply with specific percentages of moisture, ash,
heat, carbon, sulfur, etc. The contract also provides that the biomass needs
to conform to size, quality, consistency and other physical characteristics
so that loading and handling at the corporation’s plant can be accom-
plished without difficulty. In order to assist the cooperative in determining
compliance with the agreement, the corporation agrees to conduct and
provide the cooperative with a test of the biomass received at the corpora-
tion’s own cost. The number of tests to be performed, however, is to be
solely determined by the corporation. Cooperative Contract II also pro-
vides that in the event the corporation experiences equipment problems,
or difficulty in burning the biomass fuel, or determines after any time
that significant amount of biomass does not conform to requirements
specified in the contract, the corporation will notify the cooperative, and
the corporation will have the right to halt delivery until the biomass con-
forms to the specifications outlined in the contract.
The price clause is very detailed, containing a formula to calculate
the “avoided cost base price” of the biomass fuel and including quality
price adjustments according to variations in heating qualities and ash.
Cooperative Contract II also provides for crop establishment costs, mean-
ing that the corporation will compensate the cooperative, prior to com-
mencement of the agreement, for the establishment and management of
the biomass property as estimated and accepted by the parties. Providing
for establishment costs shows that the buyer acknowledges that the farm-
ers, through the cooperative, will need to invest capital in order to produce
and will likely need to learn new production processes. This provision is
in response to the high costs incurred by farmers to start a new process
or a new crop, especially when farmers have to choose between a tradi-
tional, more secure crop, and dedicated energy crops. For those reasons,
the corporation is willing to help finance the feedstock. Finally, the co-
operative is responsible for obtaining and keeping in force insurance
coverage for the property during the term of contract, and the corporation
has the right to inspect, review, and audit the cooperative’s books with
respect to methods by which the biomass is planted, grown, monitored,
sampled, transported, etc.
Arbitration is again the method of choice to the resolution of
disputes under the contract. Appendix A to the contract reiterates that,
as to fuel quantity, both parties agree that significant uncertainty exists,
which the cooperative may have no control over, as to biomass crops yields
and environmental force majeure, including but not limited to fire, frost,
drought, and wind damage. Thus, the corporation agrees to hold the
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cooperative harmless for the inability to deliver minimum yearly or envi-
ronmental force majeure.
In light of the aforementioned, the presence of cooperatives in the
bioenergy industry could bring many benefits. Cooperatives bring eco-
nomic advantages for their members by utilizing economies of scale through
aggregating purchases, resolving storage problems, and distributing farm
inputs for members. In the case of cooperatives, specific initial investments
might be shared among many. Cooperatives also help farmers, especially
new farmers, to organize and start growing dedicated energy crops, thereby
potentially guaranteeing greater confidence of supply for the industry.
In the case of a nascent bioenergy industry, individual farmers may not
be willing to make investments in firm-specific assets, such as land, equip-
ment, skill and personnel, and a cooperative arrangement may be a solu-
tion for these uncertainties. However, at the same time, farmers may be
reluctant in joining a cooperative for biomass production if payoffs from
these investments extend beyond their expected terms of employment.
As discussed above, the horizon-problem tends to affect decision-making
and investment within the cooperative. If the investment is uncertain,
such as investments in new land, machinery, seeds, etc. to grow biomass
and cater to new biomass plants, cooperative members will be adverse to
invest today given that there is a chance they will not be able to capture
the future payoffs of this risky investment tomorrow. Therefore, while co-
operatives present many benefits to farmers, cooperatives’ property
rights structure and consequent deficiencies serve as a barrier to the ability
of cooperatives to serve as efficient instruments to assist biomass farm-
ers. In a more vertically integrated model, the cooperative role is internal-
ized, and the costs or inefficiencies related to their role in the supply chain
is brought to zero.
V. THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In light of the asset specificity problems associated with biomass
transactions, the inevitable disputes that arise with traditional agricul-
tural contracts, and the inability of common biomass contracts to perfectly
address these concerns, vertical integration of the bioenergy industry’s
supply chain appears to be the optimal choice to reduce risks and potential
problems with the supply of biomass feedstock at this early stage of the
industry’s development. To a certain extent, contracts may be able to pro-
vide solutions to asset specificity and relationship-specific investments,
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even if there is uncertainty and the risk of potential hold-up.313 But the
existence of high asset specificity in the biomass industry gives incentives
for parties to seek more supply security than is available from spot mar-
kets or traditional supply contracts. Additionally, contracting costs may be
too high if parties try to plan for all types of contingencies and attempting
to incorporate provisions for all potential disputes that might occur will
add to the cost of the transaction.314
While the only way to address certain concerns is to allow for key
contractual terms to be changed, parties will not always willingly agree to
changes and thus any adaptation a contract undergoes may also add to
the cost of the transaction.315 In the specific case of biomass contracting,
the risk of non-delivery or non-conforming biomass, and the costs of en-
forcing a resolution in case of breach under the contract are too great for
parties to rely solely on contracting, at least during the current early stage
of the industry.
As discussed in Part I above, transaction cost economics suggests
that when costs of contracting exceed the costs of internal production, ver-
tical integration is often optimal. Furthermore, vertical integration reduces
the chance of opportunism because it produces more convergent goals and
the firm will have more complete information. In fact, buyers of feedstock
and biorefineries may want to exercise more control over farmers “for rea-
sons other than ‘lining up’ the suppl[y].”316 Other identified reasons for
further integration in an industry include marketing, confidentiality, and
pricing arrangements.317 The model contracts presented in Part IV show
how parties currently address asset specificity concerns in different clauses,
and certain clauses and features deserve further attention: type of feed-
stock, quantity and quality clauses, and logistics concerns.
A. The Impact of the Feedstock Type
The type of biomass crop involved in a supply chain is possibly one
of its most important factors. In fact, the entire cultivation and harvesting
process will depend upon the biomass purchaser desired feedstock.318 As
313 Kvaloy, supra note 104, at 551–52.
314 See id. (noting that “the leading hypothesis is still that if specificity reaches a certain
level, contractual solutions become too costly, and vertical integration becomes more likely.”).
315 Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, supra note 23,
at 251.
316 Kelley, supra note 109, at 402.
317 Id.
318 Endres et al., supra note 73, at 125.
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the United States Department of Energy states, “The success of the U.S.
bioenergy industry relies on many factors, including reliable, adequate
supply of high-quality biomass.”319
It is important to note that biomass may not yet be categorized as
a “commodity,” meaning a basic good that is interchangeable with others
of the same type and is essentially uniform across producers.320 The model
contracts demonstrate that the feedstock contracted for is not easily inter-
changeable, because quality specifications, quantity and delivery specifi-
cations are significant concerns for the parties. In order for the biomass to
be manageable as a commodity, it needs to meet qualities that are com-
patible with existing commodity standards, such as high density, bulk-
flowability, and aerobic stability.321 Consequently, especially in the early
stages of the bioenergy industry, biomass farmers will most likely not be
able to load their biomass on barges for export similarly to corn and soy-
bean barges.322 Therefore, whether dedicated energy crops will one day
become a commodity will depend on farmers’ ability to achieve certain
levels of quality and supply, and many predict that if biomass feedstocks
were to become a commodity, it would make moving forward with invest-
ments much easier.323
The biomass supply chain may benefit from vertical integration
because it provides more uniformization and efficient processing of the
feedstock from the start. For instance, it may be the case that the feedstock
might need processing in its initial phase that may increase its energy
density in order to reduce transport and storage costs.324 Further prepa-
ration or pre-treatment may be required to convert the feedstock into a
form more suitable for an additional conversion process in the biorefinery.
319 Biomass Feedstocks, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy
/biomass-feedstocks, archived at http://perma.cc/GK5C-5TAP (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
320 Al Fin, Growing Demand for Biomass Could Create a New Commodity Market, OIL
PRICE.COM (May 24, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Growing
-Demand-For-Biomass-Could-Create-A-New-Commodity-Market.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/BK8U-GHXK (discussing the potential of wood fuel as a commodity).
321 REUL SMITH, IDAHO NAT’L LAB., ESTABLISHING BIOMASS COMMODITY FEEDSTOCK
SUPPLY SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.inl.gov/research/establishing-biomass
-commodity-feedstock-supply-systems/d/establishing-biomass-commodity-feedstock-supply
-systems.pdf.
322 Schill, supra note 191 (noting that “public forums for price discovery that exist for
commodities like corn, soybeans and oil are not like to emerge for biomass.”).
323 Lisa Gibson, Wood: the Next Global Commodity?, BIOMASS MAGAZINE (Jun. 22, 2011),
http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/5610/wood-the-next-global-commodity, archived at
http://perma.cc/3VHK-M85D.
324 THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 20.
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Consequently, improving the efficiency of the supply chain will require that
the feedstock be developed in a way that increases the efficiency of the
conversion process.325 How the stages of the biomass supply chain are
managed and organized today will determine the benefits that the bio-
fuel produced can offer tomorrow.326
The model biomass contracts presented above use mainly forestry
materials, such as tree trunks and leaves, but some also includes agricul-
tural residues. For instance, Cooperative Contract II defines the biomass
fuel as “plant material including trunks, stems, leaves, and twigs harvested
for fuel feed-stock to produce electricity, not having a dual commercial
use, and qualifying under the current definition.”327 One of the reasons we
might see the prevalence of one type of feedstock over dedicated energy
crops in the model contracts is because of the logistical differences between
corn grain and ethanol plants; while the infrastructure for production,
harvest, storage, transportation, and price risk management of corn and
other traditional grains are well-known and well-developed, it is virtually
nonexistent for dedicated energy crops.328
Nonetheless, as pointed out in the beginning of this Article, in the
long-run, the large-scale production of biofuels and renewable energy will
require additional resources other than wood materials. Accordingly:
Future biofuels are likely to be produced from a much
broader range of feedstocks including the lignocellulose in
dedicated energy crops, such as perennial grasses, and from
forestry, the co-products from food production, and domes-
tic vegetable waste. Advances in the conversion processes
will almost certainly improve the ef ciency and reduce the
environmental impact of producing biofuels, from both ex-
isting food crops and from lignocellulose sources. A signifi-
cant advantage of developing and using dedicated crops and
trees for biofuels is that the plants can be bred for purpose.
This could involve development of higher carbon to nitrogen
ratios, higher yields of biomass or oil, cell wall lignocellulose
characteristics that make the feedstock more amenable for
processing, reduced environmental impacts and traits en-
abling the plant species to be cultivated on marginal land of
325 Id. at 29.
326 Id. at 20.
327 Infra app. E.
328 Epplin et al., supra note 39, at 1296.
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low agricultural or biodiversity value, or abandoned land no
longer suitable for quality food production.329
Thus, the type of feedstock used, or to be more widely used, by the
industry is relevant because it indicates whether higher or lower physical
asset specificity exists. As explained above, physical asset specificity is
high for transacting parties when te product is unique and has a very
limited market. Higher levels of asset specificity can be identified where
a limited market exists for dedicated biomass crops and where biofuel
plants are feedstock specific, employing only limited types of feedstock
for producing their products.
B. The Impact of Minimum Quantity and Quality Clauses
In order to build a biorefinery, there must be reasonable assurances
that feedstock supply will be available at startup, meaning that the feed-
stock supply must be aligned with the goals of the biorefinery for it to
achieve success. Bioenergy producers have large investments at stake.
Consequently, they would most likely prefer at least multi-year commit-
ments from farmers to ensure a sufficient supply of biomass feedstock to
operate the facility.330 There are unresolved legal issues in this area, mostly
in the application of the Uniform Commercial Code and common law, but
we will focus on the contractual aspect of this relationship, and how the
choice of governance structure may affect the biomass supply chain.
The quantity clause will determine the amount of biomass to be
supplied under the contract. Defining the quantity to be delivered is impor-
tant for bioenergy producers because it ensures an adequate supply for the
year. Minimum quantity requirements also benefit farmers, because they
create some financial stability that a certain amount of the crop will be
purchased by the buyer, or the latter will be in default under the contract.
All of the model biomass contracts (except for the Biomass Exchange
Contract) have specific terms to guarantee the quality of the biomass de-
livered. Cooperative Contract II is an example of a contract that suggests
high physical asset specificity. It requires a specific nature and source of
biomass, testing specifications, moisture, weight content, chemical and min-
eral constituents. All specific requirements reflect how particular the prod-
uct is and how it may change from one purchaser of feedstock to another.
329 THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 2.
330 Goeringer et al., supra note 31, at 74.
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While the type of feedstock used in Cooperative Contract II is generally
material from plants, such as the trunk, stems and leaves, quality require-
ments are still provided for in the contract.
In general, quality clauses appear to be the most important pro-
visions in the model biomass contracts because they are generally more
detailed than other clauses. That is because depending on the conversion
process used, biomass may need to be of a specific quality in order to be
effectively and economically converted into bioenergy. As noted above,
asset specificity will lead to bilateral dependency and possible abuses and
hold-up by one of the parties. Since the contract cannot provide compen-
sation or action for every possible situation, incomplete contracts will cause
uncertainty and may prevent parties from entering the biomass market.
If the feedstock does not conform to the quality specifications, the model
contracts generally provide non-compliance as an event of default, or con-
tinued non-compliance is deemed a material event that may result in the
termination of the contract. While this appears to lay down a clear conse-
quence for quality problems, if the biorefinery terminates the contract, the
question becomes where will it acquire a specific crop sufficiently similar
to the one contracted for. Especially in the case of a large farmer, or large
cooperative, it will be unlikely that the biorefinery will be able to promptly
obtain the product it needs.
In summary, not only the type, but also the quality of feedstock
is certainly one of the major factors driving the choice of the most adequate
organization of the supply chain for different sectors of the bioenergy in-
dustry. For example, if a biofuel producer’s production process requires a
certain biomass quality for it to work, the production contract should clearly
define the type of feedstock and required quality provisions. However, while
well-defined specifications for quality may address buyers’ concerns, they
do not generally account for all possible contingencies, and the failure of
any party to perform puts not only the continuance of the relationship at
risk, but also the consistent and regular supply of feedstock.
C. Cooperation and Logistics Provisions in the Contract
Biomass production raises a number of logistical issues. Many
farmers still struggle with the particulars of cultivating biomass and es-
tablishing the allocation of tasks that are needed at harvest.331 Collecting
and storing the biomass also raises concerns. The feedstock must meet
331 See Logistics of a Biopower Plant, supra note 48 (discussing biomass logistic issues).
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quality and moisture content specifications upon delivery and those will
be affected by the storage method of the feedstock.332 Addressing logistics
concerns will most likely benefit parties in the contract because large in-
vestments and high expectations are at stake. Biomass purchasers may
wish to consider the benefits of contracting for access and monitoring of
the farmer’s land so that they may follow the feedstock development more
closely. Inadequate coordination on a new biomass crop where the farmer
needs to make investments in know-how and machinery, for instance, can
result in an inadequate production despite the farmer’s best efforts.
In this case, if the biomass cannot be easily redeployed, its value
will depend on the relationship between the biomass producers and biore-
finery, placing the former in a disadvantageous position in relation to the
biorefinery. The opportunistic behavior would be a consequence of the high
physical asset specificity. The biorefinery may take advantage of its posi-
tion and seek to renegotiate the terms of the contract. At the same time, the
biorefinery is also in a position of dependence to a specific crop product, and
the biorefinery attempts to address this issue in the contract. For instance,
Aggregator Contract I suggests that parties should insert a provision that
farmers agree to cooperate in keeping the Aggregator informed about the
crop development, as well as give the Aggregator access to the property
under certain circumstances that are rather subjective. During the perfor-
mance of the contract, the parties will eventually conclude whether these
provisions are sufficient or not to guarantee quality and a continuous re-
lationship, which generates uncertainty and increases transaction costs
and the potential for future conflict.
In terms of parties’ preference about delivery provisions, the
Biomass Exchange Contract establishes that the supplier of biomass is re-
sponsible for delivery, including costs of delivery, and Aggregator Con-
tract I establishes that seller bears the risk of loss and responsibility for
the insurance until the biomass is delivered. While the farmer is the one
with the know-how and ability to supply the biomass to the buyer, the
buyer of the feedstock usually has more control over delivery schedules,
required quantities, and inspections to guarantee that the farmer is plant-
ing in accordance with the contract. The model contracts generally put the
burden on the farmer to produce, collect, and store the biomass before de-
livery. The next question is, despite the contract provisions, what would
the biorefinery do if the biomass is not delivered? Whether the biomass
end-user will have other options will depend on the type of feedstock
332 See id. (discussing how the storage method may affect the biomass feedstock).
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available, location, quantities, etc. At the same time, if the buyer does not
accept the biomass, the farmer will have to resell the feedstock. Farmer’s
options to resell the biomass will depend on circumstance and market con-
ditions. Uncertainty, therefore, cannot be easily and sufficiently contracted
around.
CONCLUSION
We provide a thorough and extensive empirical analysis of the
contracting issues that inform the optimal organization of the biomass
supply chain for the developing bioenergy industry. At the outset of a dy-
namic bioenergy industry, vertical integration is likely the best organiza-
tional model to account for uncertainty and transaction costs of contracting
between farmers, or a cooperative, and bioenergy producers. Based on our
analysis of model biomass contracts, and our empirical study of agricul-
tural contract arbitration cases, we argue that the most common disputes
in agricultural contracts will likely occur in biomass supply contracts. But
because biomass contracts have unique characteristics and their transac-
tions involve high levels of asset specificity, the failure to deliver and meet
quality standards puts the nascent bioenergy industry at risk.
First, the active role played by the biomass purchaser in the model
contracts results in expensive monitoring and enforcement costs, and
whether such oversight will actually resolve uncertainties and guarantee
quality and delivery of the biomass is not clear. Increased control over the
farmer’s crop, however, does not necessarily mean sharing the risk of loss.
As we propose, vertical integration is a better organizational option than
long-term contracts to resolve these issues once and for all, and provide
the bioenergy industry with the incentives it needs to further develop.
Second, if the farmer is establishing a new biomass crop, the parties
to a contract would need to add non-standard provisions to address the
effect of high asset specificity since the farmer will be reluctant in making
the first commitment to grow a specific quality crop for a particular buyer
without greater assurance that no hold-up or breach of contract will occur.
The threat of hold-up in the nascent bioenergy industry will depend of the
characteristics of the particular transaction. When the farmer makes ex
ante investments presenting high asset specificity to supply the needs for
specific feedstock, the farmer is in a vulnerable position since the buyer
knows that the next best value for farmer in the market will be lower. The
model biomass contracts have specific quality, quantity, delivery and
logistics concerns, especially allowing the buyer (i.e., the biorefinery) more
control over the farmer’s actions.
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Third, while failing to deliver and meet quality specifications are
generally a material term under the model contracts that would allow
the buyer to cancel the entire contract, biomass end-users may have their
hands tied because the feedstock is the basic material needed for their
production. Whether buyers can afford to take the risk will depend on the
uniqueness of the product, and the timing of product’s use for the biorefin-
ery. In agricultural contracts, our research shows that failure to deliver
crops is the most common complaint against farmers. In typical agricultural
contracts, most crops are not specific and may be purchased from a third
party with fewer consequences than it would be in the case of biomass.
Vertical integration would again eliminate the risk of non-delivery and
guarantee constant and reliable supply for the industry. Even if ex ante
investments were already made, reducing the initial costs for farmers, de-
pendency and delivery risks still permeate the contracts, and until differ-
ent types of biomass become commodities, vertical integration appears to
be the best choice.
While contract arrangements are an important way to secure a
reliable source of biomass supply, market failures such as the ones de-
scribed in this Article may undermine the relationship between the farmer
and the purchaser of biomass feedstocks, and put production and the de-
velopment of the bioenergy industry at risk. Vertical integration, at least
in this early stage of the industry, will eliminate this risk. As the bioenergy
industry matures and risks and costs are better defined, the organiza-
tional structure may move towards more arms-length contracts. This
means that as the bioenergy industry develops, asset specificity may de-
crease, initial costs and implementing costs may also decrease, and there
will be a larger number of parties offering products and services to com-
plement the biomass market.
In conclusion, when the biomass purchaser acquires control over
the price, quantity, and quality of the product, the uncertainty present in
the market is eliminated. In face of such uncertainty in a nascent industry,
vertical integration appears to be the best solution to bilateral asset spec-
ificity concerns and to prevent contractual disputes.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: BIOMASS EXCHANGE CONTRACT
Model Contract Ii has five pages with twenty basic terms: Deliver-
ies; Prices; Payment; Warranties; Inspections and Improper Delivery;
Hazardous Substance; Assignment; Alteration of Agreement; Delay and
Termination; Independent Contractor; Non-waiver; Limitation of Liability;
Changes; Severability; Indemnification; Dispute Resolution; Applicable
Law; Survivability; Entire Agreement; and Counterparts. The Deliveries,
and Inspections and Improper Delivery are the most detailed clauses in
the contract.
i MINNEAPOLIS BIOMASS EXCHANGE, BIOMASS SUPPLY AGREEMENT (2009), available at
https://www.mbioex.com/contracts/MBioEX_Biomass_Supply_Agreement.pdf.
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APPENDIX B: AGGREGATOR CONTRACT I
Model Contract II has nineteen pages and four exhibits. It is di-
vided in three basic terms: Definitions; General Conditions; and Special
Conditions. The Special Conditions clause is divided into: Nature and
Source of Biomass, Quantity Offered for Sale, Specifications; Testing,
Delivery Location, Time for Delivery, Compensation, Contingencies, Term,
Commencement, Right to Reject Non-confirming Biomass Delivery, Rep-
resentations Growing & Harvesting Practices, and Notices.
RECITALS
A. Purchaser desires to procure a consistent supply of biomass of reliable
quantity, and quality for processing as [Insert Purchaser’s specific pur-
pose such as pelletizing for fuel for heat or power generation, feed-
stock for bio-based products or advanced biofuels] (the “Biomass”).
. . .
C. Purchaser wishes to purchase Biomass from Producer and others for
aggregation and processing for use or sale and Producer wishes to sell
Biomass to Purchaser.
D. Purchaser and Producer are willing to enter into this Biomass Produc-
tion Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth below, under which
Producer will provide and Purchaser will pay for the Biomass and, if
applicable, related services, as described on Exhibit A to this Agreement.
. . .
III: SPECIAL CONDITIONS
1. Nature and Source of Biomass. The Biomass delivered by Producer
shall consist of the type(s) of renewable biomass raw materials from the
specific source locations described on Exhibit A.
. . .
3. Specifications; Testing. The Biomass shall conform to the specifica-
tions established by Purchaser and listed on Exhibit A (the “Specifica-
tions”). The Biomass shall be tested for conformity to the Specifications
as set forth on Exhibit A. All testing conducted by Purchaser at the
Delivery Location shall be at the sole cost of Purchaser. If third party
testing is required, it shall be conducted with the frequency and the cost
allocated as set forth on Exhibit A. Producer shall have the option to
collect duplicate samples of the material tested by Purchaser and have
such samples tested, at Producer’s expense.
. . .
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10. Right to Reject Non-Conforming Biomass Delivery. If any
delivery of Biomass or portion thereof (e.g., a container within a multi-
container delivery) is “Non-Conforming” to Specifications, as set forth in
Exhibit A, Purchaser shall have the right to reject the Non-Conforming
Biomass delivery or Non-Conforming portion thereof.
. . .
Exhibit A
. . .
4. Non-Conforming Biomass Delivery. A Biomass delivery shall be
considered “Non-Conforming” for purposes of this Agreement if any of
the following circumstances apply: [Insert degree of deviation from
Specifications that trigger right to reject].
. . .
Exhibit D
GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. Cooperation. Purchaser and Producer agree to cooperate fully with
each other in the provision of the Services, including, without limitation,
timely payment, timely access to the Delivery Location, and timely
provision of requested information, including advance notice of material
changes in circumstances that may frustrate performance of either Party’s
obligations under this Agreement.
2. Independent Contractor. Purchaser and Producer agree that
Purchaser is engaging Producer as an independent contractor and Pro-
ducer shall determine the means and the methods of delivering the Bio-
mass and performing the related services. Producer shall not be considered
the agent, servant or employee of Purchaser at any time or under any cir-
cumstances or for any purpose whatsoever.
. . .
7. Audit & Inspection. Purchaser, upon reasonable notice to Aggregator
at any time during regular business hours, shall have the right to audit
and inspect Aggregator’s books and records with respect to the methods
by which (a) the source material for the Biomass is obtained; and (b) the
Biomass is sampled, analyzed, loaded and transported under this Agree-
ment.
. . .
12. Dispute Resolution. Any dispute arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, including but not limited to the making of it or the alleged
breach of it, including claims of fraud in the inducement, and any alleged
violation of any right created by statute, shall be discussed between the
disputing Parties in a good faith effort to arrive at a mutual settlement of
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any such controversy. If, notwithstanding, such dispute cannot be resolved,
the Producer and Purchaser agree that such dispute shall be settled by
binding arbitration . . . Arbitration will be conducted pursuant to the provi-
sions of this Agreement, and the commercial arbitration rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, unless such rules are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement. If one or both of the parties is a resident of
a foreign jurisdiction, the parties may mutually agree in writing prior to
arbitration commencement to have such arbitration conducted pursuant
to the provisions of this Agreement and the commercial arbitration rules
of the International Chamber of Commerce. Limited civil discovery shall
be permitted for the production of documents and taking of depositions.
Unresolved discovery disputes may be brought to the attention of the ar-
bitrator who may dispose of such dispute. The arbitrator shall have the
authority to award any remedy or relief that a court of this state could
order or grant; provided, however, that punitive or exemplary damages
shall not be awarded. The arbitrator may award to the prevailing Party,
if any, as determined by the arbitrator, all of its costs and fees, including
the arbitrator’s fees, administrative fees, travel expenses, out-of-pocket
expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees. . . .
. . .
14. Insurance. Producer agrees to keep in force at its own expense,
during the entire period of the Services, the following insurance: [Insert
as applicable]
a. Commercial General Liability Insurance:
b. Workers Compensation Insurance:
c. Other Insurance:
Producer agrees to indemnify and hold Purchaser harmless against any
loss, damage or liability to third parties resulting from Producer’s breach
of its agreement to keep the required insurance in place.
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APPENDIX C: AGGREGATOR CONTRACT II
Aggregator Contract II has seventeen pages and four exhibits. It is divided
in three basic terms: Definitions; General Conditions; and Special Condi-
tions. The Special Conditions clause is divided into: Process and Objectives,
Nature and Source of Biomass, Quantity Offered for Sale, Specifications;
Testing, Delivery Location, Time for Delivery, Compensation, Contin-
gencies, Term, Commencement, Right to Reject Non-confirming Biomass
Delivery, Representations Growing & Harvesting Practices, and Notices.
RECITALS
A. Purchaser desires to procure a consistent supply of processed biomass
of reliable quantity, size, and quality [as fuel for heat or power genera-
tion] [as feedstock for bio-based products or advanced biofuels] [Alterna-
tively, insert Purchaser’s other specific purpose] (the “Biomass”).
B. Aggregator is an aggregator and processor of such Biomass.
C. Purchaser wishes to purchase Biomass from Aggregator and Aggre-
gator wishes to sell Biomass to Purchaser.
D. Purchaser and Aggregator are willing to enter into this Biomass
Procurement Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth below, under
which Aggregator will provide and Purchaser will pay for the Biomass and,
if applicable, related services, as described on Exhibit A to this Agreement.
. . .
III: SPECIAL CONDITIONS
1. Process & Objectives
a. Process. Purchaser is procuring the Biomass for use in the following
process [Insert description of Purchaser’s industrial use, power generation
or other biomass conversion process] (“Purchaser’s Process”). Aggregator
will use commercially reasonable efforts to supply the Biomass and, if appli-
cable, provide the related services in a manner that supports Purchaser’s
Process.
b. Objectives. Aggregator and Purchaser have entered into this Agree-
ment to accomplish the following objectives and further their respective
interests: [Insert as Applicable]. The Parties acknowledge that the above
described interests of Purchaser and Aggregator are material provisions
of this Agreement.
2. Nature and Source of Biomass. The Biomass delivered by Aggre-
gator shall be derived from one or more of the renewable biomass raw
materials described on Exhibit A.
. . .
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Exhibit A
Scope of Work/Specifications
1. Nature & Sources of Biomass: The Biomass will be derived from the
following sources: [Specify types of biomass raw material that are per-
mitted in Biomass and source location(s).]
2. Biomass Processing. Aggregator shall provide the following process-
ing to the Biomass before delivery to Purchaser at the Delivery Location:
[Insert description of pelletizing, densification etc.]
3. Delivery Location Testing Specification: Each Delivery of Biomass
shall be tested for the following specifications at the Delivery Location in
accordance with the protocols listed below:
a. Weight (in Pounds): Purchaser shall weigh each delivery of Bio-
mass at the Delivery Location.
b. Moisture. Moisture content shall be measured as a percentage
of the weight of the Biomass and shall not exceed __% by weight.
Moisture content shall be measured by Purchaser at the Delivery
Location by [Insert methodology.].
c. Free of Foreign Matter Contamination: Purchaser shall visually
inspect each delivery of Biomass at the Delivery Location to confirm
that it is free of non-trivial amounts of foreign material, including,
but not limited to trash, soil, stones, plastics, dirt, metal and other
inorganic content. Notwithstanding whether a delivery passes
visual inspection, in no event shall any delivery exceed ___% of
such content.
d. Biomass Particle Size12: ________________________________
e. BTU Content: The Biomass shall have an average BTU content
of MMBTU/Ton, measured over [insert time period and weight of
measured Biomass sampled.]. BTU content of the Biomass shall
be measured by Purchaser as follows: [Insert where and how.]
f. Ash Content: The ash content of the Biomass shall not exceed
% by weight.
g. Alkalinity Corrosion: [Insert applicable Specifications].
h. Other Criteria (Please Attach)
4. Specifications for Laboratory Testing. [Need to specify how often
testing occurs, who does the testing and, if testing is performed by a
third party, how the cost of testing is allocated.]
5. Non-Conforming Biomass Delivery. A Biomass delivery shall be
considered “Non-Conforming” for purposes of this Agreement if any of the
following circumstances apply: [Insert degree of deviation from Speci-
fications that trigger right to reject].
. . .
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Exhibit B
Compensation
Purchaser shall compensate Aggregator for the Biomass and any related
services provided under this Agreement as follows:
1. Indexed Compensation for Biomass. Purchaser shall compensate
Aggregator for Biomass based the indexes and formulas that are set forth
on Exhibit B, Schedule 1, as adjusted by the items below.
2. Compensation for Additional Services. If not included in the cost
of the Biomass under Section 1 above, Purchaser shall further compensate
Aggregator for the services describe below as follows:.
a. Transportation & Delivery Services16. List any additional charge
for transportation and how it is determined (by distance from re-
ceiving point to point of Biomass origin, etc.).
b. Storage Services. [List any additional charge.]
Crop Establishment Assistance. ___Yes ___No. (If Purchaser is
paying Aggregator amounts for crop establishment, attach Crop
Establishment Assistance Schedule setting for amount and terms
of assistance)
3. Environmental Attributes. Any carbon credits, greenhouse gas off-
sets, green tags, renewable energy credits, production tax credits for re-
newable energy, allowances for air emissions or any other environmental
attributes associated with the Biomass and its use by Purchaser shall, and
any credits, grants or incentive payments derived therefrom (“Environ-
mental Attributes”) shall, as between Purchaser and Aggregator
. . .
7. Take or Pay. Biomass deliveries ___will ___will not be made on a
take or pay basis.
Exhibit D
GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. Cooperation. Purchaser and Aggregator agree to cooperate fully with
each other in the provision of the Services, including, without limitation,
timely payment, timely access to the Delivery Location, and timely provi-
sion of requested information, including advance notice of material
changes in circumstances that may frustrate performance of either Party’s
obligations under this Agreement.
2. Independent Contractor. Purchaser and Aggregator agree that
Purchaser is engaging Aggregator as an independent contractor and Aggre-
gator shall determine the means and the methods of delivering the Biomass
and performing the related services. Aggregator shall not be considered
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the agent, servant or employee of Purchaser at any time or under any cir-
cumstances or for any purpose whatsoever.
. . .
12. Dispute Resolution. Any dispute arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, including but not limited to the making of it or the alleged
breach of it, including claims of fraud in the inducement, and any alleged
violation of any right created by statute, shall be discussed between the
disputing Parties in a good faith effort to arrive at a mutual settlement of
any such controversy. If, notwithstanding, such dispute cannot be re-
solved, the Aggregator and Purchaser agree that such dispute shall be
settled by binding arbitration. Judgment upon the award rendered by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The
arbitrator shall be a retired state or federal judge or an attorney who has
practiced business litigation for at least 10 years. If the Parties cannot
agree on an arbitrator within 20 days, each party shall designate an ar-
bitrator and such selected persons shall choose a third arbitrator with
the required qualifications who shall arbitrate the dispute. Arbitration will
be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and the com-
mercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association, unless
such rules are inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. If one
or both of the parties is a resident of a foreign jurisdiction, the parties may
mutually agree in writing prior to arbitration commencement to have
such arbitration conducted pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement
and the commercial arbitration rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce. Limited civil discovery shall be permitted for the production of
documents and taking of depositions. Unresolved discovery disputes may
be brought to the attention of the arbitrator who may dispose of such
dispute. The arbitrator shall have the authority to award any remedy or
relief that a court of this state could order or grant; provided, however,
that punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded. The arbitrator
may award to the prevailing Party, if any, as determined by the arbitra-
tor, all of its costs and fees, including the arbitrator’s fees, administrative
fees, travel expenses, out-of-pocket expenses and reasonable attorneys’
fees. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the place of any arbitration
proceedings shall be______ County.
14. Insurance. Aggregator agrees to keep in force at its own expense, dur-
ing the entire period of the Services, the following insurance: [Insert as
applicable]
a. Commercial General Liability Insurance:
b. Workers Compensation Insurance:
c. Other Insurance:
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Producer agrees to indemnify and hold Purchaser harmless against any
loss, damage or liability to third parties resulting from Producer’s beach
of its agreement to keep the required insurance in place.
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APPENDIX D: COOPERATIVE CONTRACT I
Cooperative Contract I has approximately eight pages where it
includes ten basic terms: Purpose and Intent; Definition of Biomass Fuel;
Quality of Biomass Fuel; Insurance; Plantation Site Plan; Crop Estab-
lishment Cost; Reimbursement of Crop Establishment Costs; Term of
Agreement; Pricing of Biomass Fuel; and Quantity of Biomass Fuel. The
Quantity of Biomass Fuel is one of the most complex clauses, and it in-
cludes four sub-terms: Basics of Determining Quantity Levels, Fuel Supply
Agreement Biomass Fuel Quantity Levels, Biomass Fuel Quantity Levels
from Individual Plantations and Plantation Crop Performance.
SECTION 1. PURPOSE AND INTENT
Cooperative has been formed by a number of agriculture and farming
interests consisting of individuals and/or corporations (“Members”), to
provide its Members with “Business Services” (as defined in the By-Laws
and Prospectus of the Cooperative) to, among other services, market and
provide Biomass Fuels to electric utilities. As part of the Business Services
performed on the of behalf of its Members, Cooperative shall enter into
a Energy Crop Biomass Fuel Supply Agreement (“Fuel Supply Agree-
ment”) with the ____and is contained in Appendix A of this Agreement.
. . .
SECTION 3. QUALITY OF BIOMASS FUEL
“Fuel Quality and Size Specifications” for the Biomass Fuels shall be in
accordance with Section 7 of Fuel Supply Agreement. In the event that
Land Owner/Grower is unable to comply with these Quality and Size spec-
ifications for Biomass Fuels, compensation to Land Owner/Grower for the
Biomass Fuel shall be adjusted in accordance with Sections 9.5, 9.5.1, and
9.5.2 of the Fuel Supply Agreement.
Land Owner/Grower recognizes that the continued non-compliance of
Fuel Quality and Size Requirements by the Land Owner/Grower, shall
be a Material Event, and may result in Termination of the Fuel Supply
Agreement (affecting all Cooperative Members), under conditions as
described in Sections 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and Section 18 of the Fuel Supply
Agreement.
. . .
SECTION 6. CROP ESTABLISHMENT COST
At the completion of all necessary activities required to establish the
Approved Site Plan, Land Owner/Grower shall submit a Report of crop
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establishment costs, including adequate documentation (i.e., invoices, bills,
bids for future work) for Cooperative’s approval. The Approved Report
shall provide the basis for ____ contribution to the establishment and
maintenance cost of the plantation and will become part of this Agree-
ment, and referenced as Appendix D.
The Approved Report for the following expenses (“Establishment Costs”),
shall include all reasonable costs associated with actual and future ex-
penses (until expected first harvest):
Establishment Planting Costs: This shall include incurred costs of
Plantation Site Planning (i.e., Professional Forester), Land Preparation,
Fire Control and Pest Management Systems, Irrigation Systems (if any),
Seedling Costs, Seed Costs, Labor Costs, Tree Planting Costs, Feedstock
Delivery Costs, Fertilizer, Compost or mulch, Weed Control Costs, Lab
Testing (i.e., soil samples, testing on expected equivalent future biomass
fuel feedstocks from Plantation, etc.), Site Permitting/Licensing, and
Applicable Legal Costs.
Present Value Cost Land Use Costs: This shall include a documented
current market value of the alternative use of the Plantation Site Land
(i.e., livestock grazing), or actual Land Lease expenses to be incurred.
This amount shall not exceed $_____ per acre year. The dollar amount
allowed to be included in Appendix D shall be derived as follows:
1. The Total Acres Planted By Crop Species Type, times
2. Land Use Cost (i.e., market value, land lease cost) Per Acre Month,
times
3. The Number Of Estimated Months Until First Harvest, equals
4. Gross Land Use Costs.
The Value of Gross Land Use Costs shall be reduced by a present value
discount factor determined by the Cooperative (using current cost of
money borrowing rates), to define the total Present Value Land Use Costs
to be incurred for the Plantation Site during the time period of initial
crop establishment to the expected first harvest.
Insurance Costs: This shall include the actual and forecasted costs of
keeping in force “Energy Crop Insurance” (a described in Appendix B),
during the time period of initial crop establishment to the expected first
harvest.
Site Maintenance Costs: This shall include the forecasted costs of main-
taining the Plantation Site during the time period after initial crop
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establishment to the expected first harvest. Allowable Site Maintenance
Costs may include, but not be limited to, mowing, fertilizer, irrigation costs,
pest control, weed control, and forestry management.
Financing Costs: Shall include the sum of (1) Financing Costs incurred by
the Cooperative as defined in Section 7 of this Agreement, and (2) the
Land Owner’s/Grower’s financing costs (using a debt borrowing rate iden-
tical to that of Cooperative) in financing Establishment Costs.
. . .
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APPENDIX E: COOPERATIVE CONTRACT II
Model Contract VIii has approximately twenty-six pages, including
five pages of Exhibits. It is divided in nineteen basic terms: Purpose and
Intent; Definitions; Term; Representations; Quantity; Source and Deliv-
ery; Quality and Specifications; Weights, Sampling, Analysis; Price; Crop
Establishment Cost; Invoices, Billing, Payment; Force Majeure; Audit
and Inspection; Notices; Right to Resale; Indemnity; Dispute Resolutions;
Termination for Default; and Construction of Agreement. The Exhibits pro-
vide for specifications on Biomass Fuel Quantity and Delivery; Plantation
Establishment Costs; Letter of Credit; and Insurance. The most complex
clause in the contract appears to be the Price clause, which is subdivided
in: Avoided Cost Base Price; Economic Value Cost Sharing; Minimum
Value of Economic Value Cost Sharing; Total Base Price; Quality Price
Adjustments; and Government Regulations Affecting Price.
ii BIOMASS PROGRAM, CTR. FOR NATURAL RES., UNIV. OF FLA., ENERGY CROP BIOMASS FUEL
SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL FUELS COOPERATIVE AND CITY OF
LAKELAND, FL, DEP. OF ELECTRIC AND WATER UTILITIES (1999), available for download
at http://www.retscreen.net/fichier.php/1590/fuelcontract.doc.
